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ABSTRACT
In this article, four authors with varying perspectives debate
various approaches to reforming the legal profession in Russia. We
start out with a short introduction to the legal profession in Russia
today, set out the reform that is currently proposed by the Russian
government and then present three perspectives on this reform. Two of
us are retired partners at large law firms with substantial presence in
Russia, and two of us are law professors teaching about the legal
profession in two law schools, one in Russia and one in the United
States. All of us have taught comparative legal ethics to top Russian
law students in a one-week program jointly organized by the law firms
of White & Case and DLA Piper, Moscow State University, and the
Public Interest Law Network. 1 It is through this work that we know
each other and have come to conceive of this article. All opinions are
tentative and each author’s own.

* Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.
** Associate Professor of Law, Moscow State University.
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Avocat au barreau de Paris (France). Opinions expressed in this article are his own and not those
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**** Retired Partner, DLA Piper International LLP; Lecturer in Law, Columbia Law
School; Solicitor of the Senior Courts of England and Wales and Avocat au barreau de Paris
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1. For a description and analysis of this program, see Phillip M. Genty, Dichotomy No
Longer? The Role of the Private Business Sector in Educating the Future Russian Legal
Profession, 40 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 283, 288-90 (2012).
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IV.
I.

A SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN
RUSSIA
A.

Historical background

Prior to the 1917 Revolution, the Russian legal profession first
emerged from the 1864 Judicial Reform Act proclaimed by Alexander
II, which for the first time created independent lawyers’ guilds
consisting of local bars.2 In the aftermath of the Revolution, the
2. For a general history of the pre-Revolutionary and Soviet bars, see EUGENE HUSKEY,
RUSSIAN LAWYERS AND THE SOVIET STATE: THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET
BAR, 1917-1939 (1986); PAMELA A. JORDAN, DEFENDING RIGHTS IN RUSSIA: LAWYERS, THE
STATE, AND LEGAL REFORM IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA (2005). See also Samuel Kucherov, The
Legal Profession in Pre-and Post-Revolutionary Russia, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 443, 444-53 (1956);
see also INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, TOWARDS A STRONGER LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE
RUSSIAN
FEDERATION,
ICJ
MISSION
REPORT
(2015),
available
at
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/57ee80784pdfid/57ee80784.pdf [https://perma.cc/LL93-ESDP]
[hereinafter ICJ REPORT].

274

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

profession was radically transformed and at various times in the
ensuing decades, it entirely disappeared as an institution independent
from the state. 3 In the late Soviet period, the profession comprised a
large contingent of lawyers employed by the state, in the courts, law
enforcement and economic organs, a small independent segment of
defense lawyers organized as advocates (in the Russian Republic under
a 1980 Law of the RSFSR on the Advokatura), and also, during the
perestroika years of the late eighties, a growing number of independent
practitioners practicing civil and commercial law under the form of
economic “cooperatives.” 4
This Article cannot accommodate a complete summary of the
Soviet justice system; suffice it to say that for decades it suffered from
profound systemic weaknesses. The main area of activity of advocates
was criminal defense, but judges wielded great influence in
determining trial outcomes, and were often wired to the will of
Communist party officials through telephonic instruction, a system that
commonly became known as “telephone justice.” 5 Economic disputes
between enterprises were handled outside of the courts by the
‘gosarbitrazh’, a section of the state apparatus for economic planning.
Corruption in the legal system was generally rife, including of lawyers
who illegally accepted payment from clients on top of the strictly
regulated fees paid to lawyer collectives. 6 The system was viewed by
most as lacking independence and integrity, a problem that rule of law
advocates are still working to overcome in the post-Soviet era.
In the first decade following the 1991 Soviet collapse, the Russian
legal profession did not undergo any substantial reform. New colleges
of advocates started to appear in parallel to those already existing under
the legacy 1980 RSFSR Law on Advokatura; these “parallel” colleges
operated under different rules of admission and self-regulation and
3. See, e.g., HUSKEY supra note 2, on discussing the dismantling of the bar in November
1917 (42-47) and its collectivization in 1928-1930 (150-155).
4. JORDAN, supra note 2, at 66-68; ICJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 9. In this Article and in
line with Russian practice, the expression “advokatura” designates the collective profession of
advocates working under that specific status together with their professional organs.
5. John C. Coughenour, Reflections on Russia’s Revival of Trial by Jury: History Demands
that We Ask Difficult Questions Regarding Terror Trials, Procedures to Combat Terrorism, and
Our Federal Sentencing Regime, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 399, 406 (2003); see also Molly
Warner Lien, Red Star Trek: Seeking a Role for Constitutional Law in Soviet Disunion, 30 STAN.
J. INT’L L. 41, 64 (1994).
6. Kucherov, supra note 2, at 460-61.
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were in competition and conflict with the traditional advocates. 7 The
non-advocate civil and commercial practitioners that had begun to exist
in the late eighties as cooperatives 8 continued from 1992 onwards as
law firms practicing as ordinary commercial legal entities, with a focus
on areas of law that were outside of the practice of the traditional
advokatura, such as corporate law, commercial law and tax law (these
practitioners are now commonly referred to as iuristi or biznes-iuristi
i.e. “jurists” or “business jurists”). Within the advokatura, the
institutional disarray between the competing colleges was resolved by
the 2002 Law on Advokatura, which created a single profession into
which the competing “parallel” colleges were directly merged. 9 The
non-advocate practitioners, for their part, became subject to separate
state licensing under a 1995 government regulation, 10 however this
licensing regime was discontinued after 1998. 11
B.

The Advokatura Today

1. Quantitative elements
Today, approximately 75,000 lawyers are members of the Russian
advokatura. 12 There are two other categories of lawyers subject to
specific state licensing: these are the notaries (notaryusi), who handle
estate and property transactions, of which there are approximately
7,900, and intellectual property lawyers (patentni poverenni) of which
7. Eugene Huskey, The Bar’s Triumph or Shame? The Founding of Chambers of
Advocates in Putin’s Russia, in PUBLIC POLICY AND LAW IN RUSSIA: IN SEARCH OF A UNIFIED
LEGAL AND POLITICAL SPACE 149 (Robert Sharlet & Ferdinand J.M. Feldbrugge eds., 2005).
JORDAN, supra note 2, at 71-102 (referring to this period as “Chaos in the Advokatura.”). The
traditional advocates “belonged to Soviet-era, traditional colleges” while the parallel colleges
were registered separately by the Ministry of Justice. JORDAN, supra note 2, at 72. Jordan
suggests that behind these two competing groups was the conflict between traditionalism and
change that arguably still characterizes the profession to this day.
8. JORDAN, supra note 2, at 66-69.
9. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the 2002 Law on Advokatura (infra note 19). The
automatic admission of all existing advocates including those from former parallel colleges is at
Article 40.1 of the Law on Advokatura.
10. See ICJ REPORT supra note 2, at 9; JORDAN, supra note 2, at 79 (discussing
Governmental Regulation No. 344 of April 15, 1995).
11. JORDAN, supra note 2, at 79. It is unclear why the licensing was discontinued. A
possible explanation is the institutional disarray that followed the 1998 financial crisis.
12. Only 72,000 lawyers are practicing. See About the Russian Federal Chamber of
Lawyers, RUSSIAN FED. CHAMBER OF LAWYERS, https://en.fparf.ru/FPA_RF/about_FPA/
[https://perma.cc/T9WS-XR89] [hereinafter FEDERAL CHAMBER].
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there are perhaps 2,000 or so. 13 The remaining population of lawyers
in the private sector, i.e. civil and commercial lawyers practicing as
legal consultants and in-house counsel, are not regulated. Their number
is not known at present; overall, it is generally considered that they are
very significantly more numerous than the advocates. 14
At present, the advokatura represents the largest fully organized
group of legal professionals in Russia, “with a distinct hierarchy,
institutions, procedures and agreed standards of ethics”. 15 Only
advocates have the right to appear in criminal courts on behalf of
defendants and before the Russian Constitutional Court. 16 This grant
creates only a very limited monopoly, however, because such
specialties represent only a small part of what lawyers do for clients.
The 2002 Law on Advokatura had attempted to introduce a full
monopoly in favor of advocates on representation before all the courts,
but these provisions were struck down in 2004 by the Constitutional
Court, on the argument that they were contrary to constitutional
provisions on liberty and equality before the law. 17
13. The total number of notaries is one of the quantitative indicators set forth in the
government’s “National “Justice” Program” on which more will be said later, see infra note 78.
Regarding the number of patent attorneys, sources identified by us are somewhat less official,
see, e.g., Evgeniy Pen, V Rossii ne khvatit patentnikh poverennikh [There are not enough patent
attorneys in Russia], (Apr. 4, 2018), https://vc.ru/flood/35930-v-rossii-ne-hvataet-patentnyhpoverennyh [https://perma.cc/57PJ-XKPP].
14. See ICJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that there are no precise statistics available
for the number since the area is completely unregulated, but that most estimates are that eighty
to ninety percent of all those practicing law are in this unregulated realm). One knowledgeable
observer estimated conservatively that 430,000 unregulated lawyers were practicing in Russia
in 2008; this number can only have grown in the ensuing decade. See Dmitry Shabelnikov, The
Legal
Profession
in
the
Russian
Federation,
OSCE
(Oct.
1,
2008),
https://www.osce.org/odihr/36312?download=true [https://perma.cc/THF7-UCNL].
15. ICJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. This is of course excluding judges and lawyers within
law enforcement.
16. ICJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. Non-advocates with degrees in law may also appear
before the Constitutional Court.
17. PO DELU PROVERKE KONSTITU IONNOSTI CHASTI 5 STAT’I 59
ARBITRAZhNOGOARBITRAZHNOGO
PRO ESSUAL’NOGO KODEKSA ROSSIĬSKOĬ
FEDERA II V SV ZI S ZAPROSAMI GOSUDARSTVENNOGO SOBRANI KURULTA
RESPUBLIKI BASHKORTOSTAN, GUBERNATORA
ROSLAVSKOĬ OBLASTI,
ARBITRAZhNOGOARBITRAZHNOGO
SUDA
KRASNO RSKOGO
KRA
ZhALOBAMIZHALOBAMI R DA ORG ORGANIZA IĬ I GRAZhDAN [INGRAZHDAN [IN
THE CASE ON THE VERIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PART 5 OF ARTICLE 59 OF
THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION CODE OF ARBITRAZHPROCEDURE IN CONNECTION WITH THE
REQUESTS OF THE STATE ASSEMBLY OF THE KURULTAY OF THE REPUBLIC OF
BASHKORTOSTAN, YAROSLAVL DISTRICT, ARBITRAZH COURT OF THE KRASNODAR KRAI AND
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As a result, a great majority of Russian private practicing lawyers
face no need to be licensed in order to carry out their work, be it in
administrative law, the civil courts, commercial law, giving legal
advice, or handling transactions. 18 Likewise, these lawyers operate
under no uniform code of ethics, though they may have office policies
or be bound by ethics rules of other national jurisdictions, as discussed
further below.
2. 2002 Law on Advokatura
The 2002 Law on Advokatura, called “On Advocates’ Activity
and Advokatura in the Russian Federation,” established the present
licensing structure for advocates. 19 Advocates must graduate from a
Russian law school and must pass a qualifying exam in order to be
admitted to practice. 20 Once advocates obtain a practice license their
active status continues indefinitely. 21 The 2002 Law and the Charter of
the Federal Chamber of Advocates organize advocates into regional bar
chambers and a Russian Federal Chamber of Advocates. 22 Advocates
practice under a disciplinary code based on the Law and a 2003 Code
of Ethics adopted under the Law. 23 Bar chambers review disciplinary

COMPLAINTS OF ORGANIZATIONS OF CITIZENS], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISOKI
FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] 2004, Nono. 15-p. The
provisions struck down were Article four paragraph nine of the Law on Advokatura and the
companion provisions of the Arbitrazh Procedural Code.
18. Property, estate transactions, and certain corporate transactions (like those involving
limited liability companies) must, however, involve notaries (“notariusy”), who are subject to
licensing. Intellectual property registrations and transactions must also involve licensed
intellectual property attorneys (“patentny poverenny”).
19. OB ADBOKATSKOĬ DE TELʹNOSTI I ADVOKATURE V ROSSIĬSKOĬ FEDRA
II [On Advocates’ Activity and the Bar in the Russian Federation] SOBRANIE
ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIIKOI FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [RUSSIAN FEDERATION COLLECTION OF
LEGISLATION] 2002, No. 63, art. 8, art. 6, ¶ 4(5) [hereinafter the “Law on Advokatura”].
20. Law on Advokatura, art. 9, ¶ 1 (law degree); arts. 10, 11 (bar exam).
21. See Vadim Konyushkevich & Gleb Bazurin, Regulation of the Legal Profession in the
Russian Federation, THOMSON REUTERS PRACTICAL LAW (Apr. 1, 2017),
https://uk.practicallaw.thomsonreuters.com/1-633-8957 (last visited Dec. 5, 2018).
[https://perma.cc/Y9AK-XUC9].
22. Law on Advokatura, supra note 19, art. 29 (regional chambers) and art. 35 (Federal
chamber). Individual advocates become members of the regional chambers based on their
residency.
23. KODEKS
PROFESSIONAL’NOĬ
ĖTIKI
ADVOKATA. KODEKS
PROFESSIONAL’NOĬ ĖTIKI ADVOKATA [CODE OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF RUSSIAN
ADVOCATES], (amended 2017), (FIRST NAT’L CONG. OF RUSS. ADVOCATES 2003) [hereinafter
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cases against advocates for breach of this ethics code or other law and
may impose disciplinary sanctions ranging from reprimands and
warnings to disbarment. 24 They also carry out professional training and
advocacy for the interests of their members. 25
The Law on Advokatura sets out the key principles of legal
practice. 26 These include client confidentiality and legal privilege
(advokatskaya taina), 27 the prohibition against conflicts of interest,28
adherence to traditional lawyer principles of independence, 29 honesty,
faithfulness, and competence, 30 and a prohibition against
discontinuance of representation. While there is a provision in the law
requiring insurance of professional responsibility, this provision has
been suspended, and there is accordingly no obligation of advocates to
obtain professional liability insurance. 31 The Law on Advokatura also
sets forth the obligation of advocates to comply with the code of ethics
(more on this code below). 32
The Law on Advokatura involves strict limitations on the forms
of practice that advocates may use. They may not be employed under
any employment contracts33 and must work independently within one
of four types of law offices (“cabinets”, “colleges”, “bureaus” and
“legal consulations”), 34 all of which are registered at the relevant
regional chamber. Advocates are obligated to pay dues to their regional
chamber 35 and may not temporarily suspend their membership from the
ETHICS CODE]; The statutory basis for adoption of the Ethics Code is the Law on Advokatura.
See Law on Advokatura, art. 4, ¶ 1; art. 7, ¶ 1(4); art. 36, ¶ 2(2).
24. ETHICS CODE, supra note 23, at art. 18(6). The statutory basis for disciplinary
prerogatives of bar chambers is the Law on Advokatura. Id. atETHICS CODE, art. 29, ¶ 4; art. 30,
¶ 2(10); art. 31, ¶ 3(9); art. 33, ¶ 1; see also Coughenhour, supra note 5, at 6.; ETHICS CODE,
supra note 23, at arts. 19-27; ICJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 33-37.
25. Law on Advokatura, supra note 19, at art. 31, ¶ 3(8) (organization of professional
training); art. 29, ¶ 4; art. 35 ¶ 2 (general representation of interests).
26. Law on Advokatura, art. 4, ¶ 1.
27. Law on Advokatura, art. 8; art. 6, ¶ 4(5)
28. Law on Advokatura, art. 6, ¶ 4(2).
29. Law on Advokatura, art. 2, ¶ 1; art. 18.
30. Law on Advokatura, art. 7, ¶ 1, 3.
31. The provision regarding mandatory insurance contained in Article 7 paragraph 1
section 6 of the Law on Advokatura has been suspended by Federal Law No. 320-FZ of
December 3, 2007. Law on Advokatura, art. 7, ¶ 1(6).
32. Law on Advokatura, art. 7, ¶ 1(4).
33. Law on Advokatura, art. 2, ¶ 1.
34. Law on Advokatura, art. 20, ¶ 1.
35. Law on Advokatura, art. 7, ¶ 1(5).
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profession (for example to conduct other activities). Advocates are also
under the obligation at all times to provide free representation to certain
categories of the population 36 and to accept court-designated criminal
law cases (advokat po naznachenyu) 37 - activities that for many
advocates represent a significant portion of their time. The proper
remuneration of these activities by the state remains a problem
unresolved to this day.
Importantly, the activity of advocates is defined as providing legal
“assistance” (pomosh) and not “services” (uslugi). 38 The law expressly
sets advocates apart from “participants and employees of organizations
rendering legal services,” i.e. unregulated practitioners, which are
specifically mentioned by the law as not belonging to the profession.39
In line with other civil law systems, the activity is considered to be nonentrepreneurial. 40 Written contracts must be entered into, which are
established directly between the individual advocate (and not the law
office) and his or her client (called doveritel’ i.e. “principal”), 41 and
advocates are not able to delegate performance of their duties in court
under these contracts to colleagues or junior associates.
3. 2003 Code of Ethics
The Law on Advokatura specifically delegates to the advokatura,
acting in congress as the All-Russia Congress of Advocates, the power
to elaborate the ethical rules of the profession based on the principles
set out in the Law on Advokatura.42 The 2003 Code of Ethics (the
“Ethics Code”) is a detailed document that lays out a more
comprehensive set of ethics rules for advocates. 43 These provisions
expand on the regulation of conflicts of interest, including bans on
advocates representing parties with conflicting interests in the same
case, 44 requirements of client consent prior to joint representation

36. Law on Advokatura, art. 26.
37. Law on Advokatura, art. 25, ¶ 8.
38. Law on Advokatura, art. 1, ¶ 1 (“legal assistance”)”); contra art. 1, ¶ 3 (“legal
services”).
39. Law on Advokatura, art. 1, ¶ 3.
40. Law on Advokatura, art. 1, ¶ 2.
41. Law on Advokatura, art. 25.
42. Law on Advokatura, art. 36, ¶ 2.
43. ETHICS CODE.
44. ETHICS CODE, art. 11.
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arrangements, 45 and adherence to traditional lawyer principles of
independence and diligence, honesty, faithfulness and competence. It
prohibits advocates from discontinuing legal services in criminal cases
except as stipulated by law or for other good reasons 46 and requires
them to pursue appeals from adverse judgments at the defendant’s
request. 47 The Ethics Code requires advocates to act with honesty, good
faith and competence and to defend their clients’ rights and interests
vigorously. 48 Additional provisions prohibit advocates from
cooperating with investigators in the course of providing legal
services, 49 acting contrary to a client’s lawful interests due to personal
interests or outside pressure, 50 or exploiting personal ties with those
working in the judiciary and law enforcement. 51 The Ethics Code
contains extensive provisions defining advocates’ duties of client
confidentiality. 52 It requires advocates to ensure that all assistants and
employees comply with its rules, 53 provides means for advocates to
obtain ethics advice on complicated questions 54 and recognizes that
advocates may also be guided by the Code of Conduct for European
Lawyers where it does not conflict with the Ethics Code.55
Incorporating Russian law on the matter, it requires advocates to
participate in providing free legal services. 56
The Code also provides for a body within the Federal Chamber
called the Ethics Commission, which develops ethics standards,
produces binding explanatory notes about them, summarizes the
disciplinary practices of the Chambers and provides relevant
recommendations subject to the approval of the Federal Chamber of
Advocates. 57 These procedures allow for further ethical self-regulation
and a process for amending the Ethics Code to adapt it to new
challenges and conditions.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

ETHICS CODE, art. 11, ¶ 2.
ETHICS CODE, art. 13, ¶ 2.
ETHICS CODE, art. 13, ¶ 4.
ETHICS CODE, art. 8.
ETHICS CODE, art. 9, ¶ 3.1.
ETHICS CODE, art. 9, ¶ 1.1
ETHICS CODE, art. 9, ¶ 1(6).
ETHICS CODE, art. 6.
ETHICS CODE, art. 3 ¶ 2.
ETHICS CODE, art. 4 ¶ 4.
ETHICS CODE, art. 1.
ETHICS CODE, art. 15.
ETHICS CODE, art. 18.2.
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4. Jurists Today: The Vast Unregulated Majority of the Profession
As noted above, it is not possible to establish the precise number
of practicing jurists in Russia today, precisely because of the lack of
any register or list of persons involved in the provision of these services
or appearing on behalf of clients in civil or administrative courts.58
Unregulated jurists today do not belong to any collective professional
organization and they do not operate under any uniform ethical code.
The absence of any ethical code or organizations to enforce it has a
number of consequences that are prima facie detrimental.
First, the lack of professional regulation deprives the profession
of any monopoly power to police barriers to entry into it. 59 Because
any individual can hold himself out as a jurist, many individuals do so.
Some jurists have had little or no legal training, and some engage in
unscrupulous practices. The quality of services provided ranges
greatly, and outside of standard contract, tort or criminal liability, there
is no regulatory mechanism through which to police quality and ethical
practices in the interests of safeguarding clients’ welfare. This presence
of unscrupulous practitioners deepens the problem of corruption within
the Russian state apparatus.
Another downside of absence of regulation is the lack of legal
protections legal practitioners enjoy in many jurisdictions. Jurists in
Russia have no legal grounds to assert privilege to keep client secrets
confidential or to protect attorney-client communications, documents
reflecting such communications, or attorney work product. 60 Jurists are
therefore vulnerable to “executive interference” with their work,
including through searches and seizures, surveillance, and/or demands
to provide information about clients to government officials. 61
One of the complicating factors in the Russian context, however,
is that many of the problems that exist within the unregulated
profession also exist within the advokatura. This includes the problems
of corruption and sub-standard practices, which persist in the
advokatura despite the existence of institutions of self-policing.62
58. Supra Part I.B.1.
59. On the importance of professional regulation to the creation and maintenance of
professional monopoly in the context of legal professions, see generally RICHARD L. ABEL,
AMERICAN LAWYERS (1984). Infra Part III.C.
60. ICJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 12-13.
61. ICJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 13, 65.
62. ICJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 38:
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Another difficulty is that while advocates are theoretically entitled to
legal privileges, including attorney-client privilege and confidentiality,
observance of these privileges by law enforcement and the state
apparatus remains on the whole problematic. 63 In short, this is not a
black and white situation involving a high-quality regulated segment
with legal protections coexisting alongside low-quality unregulated
practitioners. Rather, the Russian profession is a multifaceted one,
involving multiple sub-segments, and in which geographical
distribution across a vast national territory also plays a role. The
exponential growth of unregulated practitioners was the result of strong
economic growth in the 2000s, robust demand for legal services64 and
a regulated segment (the advokatura) that was traditionally focused on
criminal representation only. The unregulated segment includes
countless individual practitioners, small, medium sized and large
commercial law firms, as well as all the foreign law firms, which
occupy a significant position in the high-end market in Moscow and
Saint Petersburg. It also includes more unusual forms of practice: legal
services are now offered to the public by the in-house departments of
some of Russia’s largest corporations. 65 With their significant
headcount and the extensive resources and regional footprint of their
The problem of corruption of lawyers, in particular lawyers appointed to provide
State-funded legal aid to defendants in criminal cases, is widely recognized as one of
the greatest challenges facing the legal profession in the Russian Federation. Such
corruption facilitates violations of human rights of suspects and accused persons,
including violations of the prohibition on torture or other ill-treatment, the right to
liberty and the right to a fair trial. It is widely recognized, that certain lawyers
appointed to provide legal aid in criminal cases fail to act in accordance with the
standards imposed by the Code of Ethics and do not provide a competent or effective
defence to their clients. Instead, they routinely serve the interests of the investigator
or the prosecutor in the case, seeking to secure a conviction and ignoring violations
of their clients’ human rights.
The term “pocket lawyers” is often used to refer to lawyers who serve the interests of
the prosecution or other powerful actors rather than those of their clients.
63. ICJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 53-58.
64. On the role of the legal profession in state-building, see generally Terence C. Halliday,
BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT (1987).
65. Reported examples are Sberbank (banking) and MegaFon (telephony). MegaFon
vykhodit na rynok pravovykh uslug dlya biznesa [MegaFon enters the market of legal services
for business], MEGAFON, (Nov. 27, 2017), https://corp.megafon.ru/press/news/
federalnye_novosti/20171127-1222.html [https://perma.cc/F72A-9QC8]; Victoria Arutunyan &
Margarita Gaskarova, Stanut li inkhaosi vnechnimi konsultantami? [Will in-house lawyers
become outside counsel?], 9 LEGAL INSIGHT, at 3-7 (2018), available at
http://legalinsight.ru/legal-insight-%E2%84%96-09-75-2018/ [https://perma.cc/L3FJ-C37G].
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parent organizations, these new structures aim to compete with
traditional “lawyer-owned” law firms throughout the Russian
territory. 66 This extreme diversity has, for several decades now,
impeded successive efforts at reform.
II. THE NEED FOR REFORM OF THE RUSSIAN LEGAL
PROFESSION
Few dispute the proposition that the Russian legal profession
continues to be in need of further reform. 67 Conventional international
practice would seem to militate for immediate regulation of the entire
profession. There are important reasons for regulating the “practice of
law” or “legal services,” in light of the significant consequences of the
provision of such services to the interests of clients. Poor quality or
unethical conduct in the legal profession has significant consequences
both to clients and more generally to the legal system and the rule of
law.
However, although an obvious need exists to ensure quality,
restrictions on the quantity of legal services providers can also have the
consequence of reducing access to such services overall, and/or
increasing their cost. 68 This concern is particularly salient in light of
the small number of Russian advocates at present (less than 75,000
individuals for a population of 144 million), uneven distribution of
advocates throughout the territory, high number of cases handled by
courts (approximately 15 million civil cases per year) 69 and existence
66. Sberbank even created a dedicated subsidiary for this activity, called “Sber Legal,” to
which it transferred one hundred or so in-house lawyers. Sberbank sozdal kompaniyu dlya
okozania yuridicheskikh uslug [Sberbank created a company for the provision of legal services],
VEDOMOSTI (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.vedomosti.ru/finance/news/2018/11/02/785553sberbank [https://perma.cc/P3N5-3QTP].2, 2018) Arutunyan & Gaskarova, supra note 65.
67. ICJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 59:
The ICJ mission noted an understanding from all relevant actors that there is a need
for reform of the legal profession in the Russian Federation. At no meeting—be it
with lawyers or independent experts or government officials—did any one assume
that the current state of the legal profession was satisfactory. Lawyers from different
parts of the profession held differing views on the nature of the problems and the
solutions that should be adopted, but all considered that reforms of some kind were
necessary to bring substantial change to the quality of the profession.
68. See Shabelnikov, supra note 14, at 11-22 (emphasizing the problem of access to
justice).
69. Pochemu advokatskaya monopoliya otkladivaetsya? [Why is advocate monopoly
postponed?],?, PRAVO (Apr. 2, 2015), https://pravo.ru/voting/199/ [https://perma.cc/K53SCGPR].

284

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:2

of an express constitutional right to legal “assistance” under Article 48
of the Russian Constitution. 70 Thus, reform of the legal profession must
be carried out such that the imperative of ensuring better quality does
not lead to an unsustainable reduction of the overall supply of legal
services and aid across the country. This is a conundrum that the
Russian profession and government have been grappling with for many
years.
A.

The Movement for Reform

1. Previous attempts at Reform
The Russian government has long been aware of the need for
reform and has attempted a number of initiatives over the years. The
2002 Law on Advokatura itself required many years of debate,
including between competing colleges of the advokatura themselves.71
The solution that was found at that time was that the “parallel” colleges
would simply be merged into the traditional criminal-law centric
advokatura of the late eighties, whose rules of operation were largely
replicated in the 2002 Law (the “parallel” colleges, in contrast,
operated in a manner that was closer to those of the commercial
profession). 72
A few years after the 2002 Law, the Russian government then
produced a bill that proposed to replicate the approach that had been
adopted in 2002 for the parallel colleges, i.e. aiming to incorporate
most of the unregulated practitioners directly into the advokatura. This
was a 2008 draft Federal Law “on the Provision of Qualified Legal
Assistance in the Russian Federation”, 73 which conditioned admission
of existing practitioners to certain minimum qualification requirements

70. Point 1 of Article 48 states that “[e]veryone“Everyone is guaranteed the right to
receive qualified legal assistance. In cases provided for by law, legal assistance is provided free
of charge.” KONSTITUTSIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [KONST. RF] [CONSTITUTION] art. 48, point
1 (Russ.). In the Russian original: Каждому гарантируется право на получение

квалифицированной юридической помощи. В случаях, предусмотренных законом,
юридическая помощь оказывается бесплатно

71. Huskey, supra note 7.
72. Jordan, supra note 2, at 87-89.
73. See a copy of the proposed bill, together with an introductory parliamentary report, in
Vestnik Federal’noy Palaty Advokatov RF, No. 3(21), 37-47 (2008), available at
https://fparf.ru/upload/iblock/54f/54f9957dc4d3772b44173b089d677c91.pdf.
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(i.e. a law degree) but did not require that they pass an exam. 74 The bill
generated fierce opposition from the advokatura, however, 75 and ended
up being abandoned.
2. 2014 Justice Program
In 2008, reform of the legal system was made into a policy priority
by then President Dmitry Medvedev. 76 The effort accelerated in 2011
with the adoption of presidential “Principles for the development of
legal awareness of citizens” 77 and then in 2014, by the adoption of a
“National Justice Program” (“Justice Program”, or “Justice”),
providing a framework for the development of new legislation to
address reform of the legal profession. 78 The Program included a subprogram 1 requiring the Ministry of Justice to approve a “concept” for
74. Id. art. 4 of proposed bill.
75. See the proceedings of a March 2008 meeting between senior parliamentarians and
representatives of the advokatura in which the latter expressed their opposition to the proposed
bill. Vestnik, supra note 73, at 35-36. Paradoxically the Federal Chamber expert review report
(by advocate G.K. Sharov) was more positive, even without an entrance examination for
unregulated practitioners. Vestnik, supra note 73, at 49-64.
76. Rossiya dolzhna preodolet pravovoi nigilism – Prezident Medvedev [Russia must
overcome legal nihilism – President Medvedev], RIA NOVOSTI (May 7, 2008),
https://ria.ru/politics/20080507/106773965.html [https://perma.cc/B7M3-XGNJ].
77. Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiyskoy Federatsii [Mentioned in the Decree of the President of
the Russian Federation], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’TVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERTSII [SZ RF]
[Russian Federation Collection of Legislation] April 28, 2011, No. PR-1168 (Rus.).. It would
appear that the Justice Program was first conceived as part of the WTO accession process, as is
suggested by a 2011 WTO-related draft document produced by the Russian government also
called “Justice Program,” which sets out in large part what later became the 2014 program.
Gosudarstvennaya programma Rossiyskoy Federatsii «Yustitsiya» [Ministry of Justice of the
Russian Federation Justice, “Justice Program], PRAVO,” (Nov. 9, 2011),
http://docs.pravo.ru/document/view/20787696/23642826 [https://perma.cc/G5KJ-NX7A].
78. Ob Utverzhdenii Gosudarstvennoy Programmy Rossiyskoy Federatsii “Yustitsiya”
[Government Resolution on the National “Justice Program” of the Russian Federation],
SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’TVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERTSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection
of Legislation] 2014, No. 312, available at (Apr. 15, 2014), (replacing a prior Government
Resolution
on
the
same,
No
517-r,
Apr.
4,
2013),
(http://minjust.ru/sites/default/files/postanolenie_pravitelstva_rossiyskoy_federacii_ot_15.04.2
014_n_312_ob_utverzhdenii_gosudrastvennoy_programmy_rossiyskoy_federacii_yusticiya.pd
f [https://perma.cc/TEP7-JBQN] [hereinafter Government Resolution No. 312] (replacing prior
Government Resolution No. 517-R on the same issue), last amended by a Government
Resolution SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’TVA ROSSIISKOI FEDERTSII [SZ RF] [Russian
Federation CollectionNo 372 of Legislation]30 March 2018, No. 372, available at
(http://minjust.ru/sites/default/files/pp_372_ot_30_03_2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HHW772FQ].)
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regulation of legal services, and specified that this concept should
create “a unified market of legal services accessible to all” and
“ensuring the protection of the public interest and the realization of the
rights of citizens and legal entities.” 79
The 2014 Program was important in highlighting the need for
reform and defining a general direction and fundamental objectives for
it, but it quickly became apparent that there were still significantly
diverging views within the profession on how to proceed. Some argued
that this was in essence a monopoly-building ploy by the advokatura
(under the leadership of the Federal Chamber in Moscow), or that the
advokatura wanted to bring all legal practitioners under its umbrella in
order to win a competition it was losing, as most high-end commercial
legal services were rendered by unregulated firms and the vast majority
of law school graduates chose to remain outside the advokatura. This
was countered by the argument on the opposite side that the objective
was not to create monopoly protection for one of the segments, but to
include all segments into one profession with the objective of raising
professional standards across the board.
3. The Ministerial Working Group and consultations with
representatives of the legal community
In light of the negative response by many practitioners, in April
2015 the Ministry of Justice created a working group of thirty members
to assist the Ministry in the elaboration of the “concept” envisaged by
the sub-program. The group was intended to be more inclusive and
included representatives of the Federal Chamber of Advocates, the
Association of Jurists of Russia, the Association of Corporate Lawyers
(AKYur), the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights,
the committee of the Duma for constitutional legislation and
construction of the State, the regional chambers of advocates, the
Supreme Court, other ministries, and, finally, members of the
profession of advocate. The meetings of the Working Group were
supplemented by meetings separately organized by the Ministry with
representatives of all sectors in the legal community, including national
and international firms in the unregulated sector as well as the Federal
Chamber of Advocates. These consultations were taken into account in

79. Government Resolution No. 312, supra note 78, at 7 (referencing paragraph entitled
“Expected results from implementation of the sub-program”).
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the gradual elaboration of the “concept” through three successive
Concept Papers issued by the Ministry of Justice.
4. The Concept Papers
The first, relatively succinct, Concept Paper was issued in late
2015, followed a year later by a more detailed second iteration, 80 and
then in October 2017 by a third version (which is the current version at
the time of writing). 81 All versions deemed unsatisfactory the current
state of the legal services market and, in order to rectify the problem,
proposed a unified profession, combining the advokatura and the
unregulated part of the profession on the basis of a “reformed”
advokatura, excluding in-house lawyers (consistent with the exclusion
of in-house lawyers from the regulated professions in many European
jurisdictions), 82 and extending the monopoly of unified profession to
all court representations. As from the second Concept Paper in 2016,
the Ministry proposed extending the monopoly to all legal services,
including legal advice. 83
The 2016 and 2017 Concept Papers placed special emphasis on
international comparisons. The regulations of selected foreign
jurisdictions84 were analyzed with respect to the definition of and
monopoly over the provision of legal services, the qualifications
required to become part of the profession (including continuing legal
educational requirements), the organization and governance of the
profession, the legal structures allowed for the collective exercise of
80. Regulation of the Market of Professional Legal Assistance Concept Paper, registered
by the Ministry of Justice, CONCEPT PAPER ON REGULATION OF THE MARKET OF PROFESSIONAL
LEGAL ASSISTANCE (2016) (Russ.) [hereinafter 2016 CONCEPT PAPER].
81. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, CONCEPT PAPER ON Regulation of the Market of Professional
Legal Assistance Concept Paper, registered by the Ministry of Justice, (2017 (Russ.))
[hereinafter 2017 CONCEPT PAPER].
82. See the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union refusing to recognize
legal professional privilege to in-house lawyers in the context of a competition law investigation
on the basis that “. . . a considerable number of Member States do not allow in-house lawyers to
be admitted to a Bar or Law Society and accordingly, do not recognize them as having the same
status as lawyers established in private practice.” Case C-550/07P, Akzo Nobel Chems. Ltd. v.
European Comm’n, 2010 E.C.R. 1-08301, ¶¶ 72-76. See also the opinion of Advocate General
Kokott in that case. Id. (A.G. Kokott, opinion), ECLI:EU:C:2010:229.
83. 2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, at § 6.3.
84. The jurisdictions considered were Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Japan,
India and the People’s Republic of China as well as some former Soviet states (Armenia, Belarus
Estonia and Kazakhstan). 2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, at § III; 2016 Concept Paper,
supra note 80, at § III.
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the profession, and ethical rules and discipline for breach thereof.85
Both Papers concluded that, on the basis of foreign experience, the
relevant points for the reform of the Russian profession are “ . . . the
unity of the profession, the standardization and transparency of
admission procedures . . . , the maintenance of the skills of lawyers,
extending the possible corporate forms for organized practice and
disciplinary procedures.” 86
As the 2017 Concept Paper was the current version at the time of
finalizing this Article (November 2018), its main contents are set out
in some detail in the paragraphs that follow. The main objective of the
reform is stated in Section IV as the formation of a “unified legal
framework for the provision of legal services”, in effect apparently
including both the existing concepts of “legal assistance” and “legal
services” (i.e. those currently rendered by unregulated practitioners).87
The other objectives include increasing the protection of the recipients
of legal services; improving the institution of advokatura by removing
restrictions that impede the efficient practice of law; creation of
standards for membership in the profession that exclude low-quality
practitioners and dishonest consultants; and the provision of
professional legal assistance meeting international standards. 88
The 2017 Concept Paper specifies that while in-house lawyers are
excluded from the reform, they will retain the right to advise and to
represent their employer in the courts. 89 Another noteworthy exception
to the proposed monopoly of the new profession is the right of
providers under the government law on free legal aid, 90 who
notwithstanding their exclusion from the new profession, will be able
to continue to provide legal assistance and to represent clients in
courts. 91 Similarly, non-profit organizations registered in accordance
with the law and providing legal assistance (including court
representation) on a pro bono basis would also permitted to continue to
do so. 92
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
(2011).
91.
92.

2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81; 2016 Concept Paper, supra note 80.
2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, at § 3.5.
2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, at § IV, § 1.
Id.
Id. § IV, ¶ 3.
Federal Law on Free Legal Aid in the Russian Federation, 2011, No. 324-FZ, ch. 4.
2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, at § IV.
Id.
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The justification for the use of the advokatura as the basis for the
reform, as opposed to the formation of a second, separate profession, is
discussed at length. According to the Concept Paper, the creation of a
separate regulated profession as a “Self-Regulating Organization”
under the relevant law 93 would be undesirable due to the need to create
dual professional and ethical standards, lack of comprehension by the
public of the difference between the different parts of the profession,
difficulties encountered by other self-regulating organizations, 94 and
budgetary considerations related to the need to supervise the new selfregulating organization. 95 On the other hand, the Concept Paper argues
that the existing advokatura already has the appropriate framework for
the reformed profession due to its tradition of providing legal
assistance, the existence of confidentiality and lawyer/client privilege,
the right of an advocate to obtain information about a matter he is
handling from the public authorities, 96 ethical rules and disciplinary
procedures, a tradition of self-regulation, an appropriate infrastructure
avoiding the need to create new institutions, appropriate legislative
basis (notwithstanding the need for important modifications) and
existing public and international recognition. 97
There is also discussion of the need to reform the advokatura to
permit lawyers to be employed by other lawyers, either through legal
entities for the collective exercise of the profession called “lawyer
formations” or directly by other lawyers. 98 The need to allow lawyers
in the new profession to create lawyer formations using existing
commercial forms is recognized, which the Concept Paper notes is not
inconsistent with the non-entrepreneurial nature of the profession, as
demonstrated by the foreign experience summarized earlier. The need
to re-establish the requirement for compulsory insurance for legal
services is endorsed, 99 as well as the need for continuing education
93. Federal Law on Self-Regulating Organizations, 2007, No. 315-FZ. (2007).
94. The Concept Paper notes that Government decree No. 2776-r of December 30, 2015
envisages the reform of the law on Self-Regulating Organizations in light of the “ineffective
performance” and “low efficiency” of Self-Regulating Organizations. 2017 CONCEPT PAPER,
supra note 86, at part IV.
95. 2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, at § V, ¶ 7.
96. Law on Advokatura, supra note 19, at art. 6.3.
97. 2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, at § V.
98. 2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, at § 5.2.
99. The Concept Paper notes that the obligation for professional liability insurance
contained in the Law on Advokatura (art. 7, ¶ 6) was suspended by a 2007 Federal Law and
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requirements, the recognition of specializations and the exclusion from
the profession of lawyers convicted of serious crimes. 100 Finally,
proposals to adjust the tax treatment of lawyers and lawyer formations
(VAT and income tax) are put forward. 101
The normative support for the reform will, according to the 2017
Concept Paper, require important modifications to the 2002 Law on
Advokatura, as well as the Labor Code, the Civil Procedure Code and
other laws, including new laws with respect to the unauthorized
practice of law. The staged introduction of these changes is described
in the last section of the Concept Paper, proposing a three stage
implementation over at least five years. The first stage would involve
elaboration and adoption of the required normative acts. The second
stage would implement the admission of non-regulated lawyers into the
regulated profession, by simplified procedures (testing only with
respect to the Law on Advokatura) for practitioners with legal degrees
and five years’ experience, or by a complete examination for those who
do not meet these criteria. 102 The third stage would involve monitoring
and possible adjustments to the timing, but as published in 2017, the
Concept envisaged that by January 1, 2023 103 only registered advocates
would be entitled to provide legal services (court representation and
advice), other than those enjoying specific exclusions from the law.104
This deadline would be adjusted if the number of advocates or “other
circumstances” impeded sufficient access to law by citizens and
organizations. 105
5. The provisions of the 2017 Concept Paper regarding international
firms
Unlike the previous Concept Papers, the 2017 Concept Paper
introduced a section about the Russian offices of international firms:

urges reconsideration of this in light of international practice requiring mandatory insurance. See
2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, at § 5.4.
100. 2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, at § 5.4.
101. 2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, at § 5.5.
102 See infra Part VI.
103. The date for the imposition of the full monopoly was extended two years beyond the
date proposed in the 2016 Concept Paper. 2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, at § 6.2.
104. 2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, at § 6.2.
105. 2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, at § 6.2.
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It should be noted that the provision of legal services on the
territory of the Russian Federation is currently also being handled
by international law firms, most of which operate in the territory
of Russia through their branches. Some of these companies form
their presence in the Russian market through the creation of
subsidiary economic companies. At the same time, as a rule, a
foreign company is the owner of 100 percent of shares in the
authorized capital. This situation has led to the fact that in Russia,
despite the new challenges and threats to national security, the
dominance of foreign law firms continues. 106

The Concept Paper recognizes the right of these international
firms to advise as to foreign law, and the rights of foreigners to qualify
as Russian lawyers if they have a Russian law degree or a recognized
foreign law degree, subject to the principle of reciprocity. 107 But it goes
on to state that:
It is also necessary to establish that from a certain point on, legal
services on issues of Russian law (including judicial
representation) on the territory of the Russian Federation will be
able to be provided only by those organizations that are registered
in accordance with Russian law as legal entities that are lawyer
formations. At the same time, it is necessary to provide for a
number of measures that exclude direct or indirect control over
such lawyers’ entities to foreign persons, in particular, by setting
restrictions on the subject composition of members of lawyer
formations, etc. 108

Such a restriction would certainly require the offices of
international firms to reorganize as Russian “lawyer formations” and
to ensure that the entity so created is owned and controlled by Russian
qualified lawyers. The issue is what is meant by “indirect” control:
typically, when international firms are confronted by local legislation
of this kind a local firm is created and some of the partners are also
partners of an international structure. There could be questions about
the contractual relations between the local and international firm
regarding the use of the name and resources of the international firm
and the presentation of the local office as part of an international
network.

106. 2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, at § 5.6 (emphasis added).
107. 2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, at § 5.
108. 2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, at § 5.
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As a result of these new provisions in the Concept Paper,
representatives of the international law firms met informally on several
occasions in November and December 2017 to formulate a common
position to express concern about this aspect of the 2017 Concept
Paper. A letter sent to the Ministry of Justice in early December on
behalf of 18 international law firms expressed support for the goals and
objectives of the Concept and underscored the leading role of
international law firms in Russia in providing qualified legal assistance
to Russian legal entities and individuals. The letter noted that the
Russian offices of international law firms have been providing services
for many years which have received recognition for the high quality by
the most demanding Russian clients, including State owned and
controlled entities. The letter also highlighted the contribution made by
international law firms to the improvement of Russian legislation and
the education of an entire generation of Russian lawyers in the best
international legal practices. This role “ . . . raises the general
professional level of Russian lawyers and ensures healthy competition,
which best suits the interests of the consumers of these services –
Russian clients.” 109
However, the letter raised concerns about the provisions of the
Concept limiting the provision of Russian legal advice to Russian legal
entities, excluding direct or indirect control over such entities by nonRussians.
It seems that the implementation of this part of the Concept leads
to the actual exclusion of international law firms . . . . Even if the
Russian offices of such firms are transformed into [Russian] legal
entities, the requirement of ‘lack of control’ will prevent their
further normal interaction with the international network of the
relevant law firm (whether on sharing experience, using a single
brand and other general assets of the firm, allocating financial
resources, other internal issues, etc.). 110

The result, according to the letter, would be the exclusion of
international law firms from the Russian market, resulting in higher
costs to the clients, decrease in the quality of legal services resulting in
a lower level of legal support for Russian organizations and citizens,
thus contradicting the goals of State policy as expressed in the Justice
109. Letter on behalf of 30 international law firms’ with offices in Russia to the Ministry
of Justice on Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (Dec. 7, 2017) (on file with the authors.).
110. Id.
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Program and the Concept itself. 111 The international firms also solicited
and obtained support for their concern from the bar authorities in the
UK, France and the United States. The Law Society of England and
Wales, the Paris Bar Council, the American Bar Association and the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York wrote to the Ministry
of Justice with respect to the treatment of foreign lawyers and law firms
to emphasize the limited restrictions applicable to the practice of law
by foreign lawyers and law firms in their respective jurisdictions.
These letters were followed by a more detailed commentary of the
2017 Concept Paper in the form of a revised version incorporating
suggested modifications, sent on December 5, 2017 to the Ministry of
Justice on behalf of over 30 international firms in Russia. Most of the
proposed changes related to the regulation of foreign law firms, while
maintaining support for the creation of a single regulated profession
with common professional and ethical requirements. The comments
included other suggested changes to the Concept and an expression of
willingness to provide further comments and suggestions in
cooperation with the Ministry. As a result of these letters, various
meetings took place in the ensuing months between representatives of
international firms and Denis Novak, the Deputy Minister of Justice
responsible for the Concept.
6. Current Status
The status of the reform was unclear at the time of finalizing
this Article (November 2018). General expressions of continued
support were made throughout 2018 by top government officials,112
and there were signals that a new version of the Concept Paper would
be forthcoming. Many question marks remained, however. Shortly
before the issuance of the 2017 Concept Paper an alternative draft law
111. Letter on behalf of 30 international law firms’ with offices in Russia to the Ministry
of Justice on Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (Dec. 7, 2017) (on file with the authors.).
112. Support of the 2017 Concept Paper was expressed by Prime Minister Dmitry
Medvedev in May 2018 at the Saint Petersburg International Legal Forum, a yearly professional
gathering. In a subsequent forum later that year the vice-minister of Justice emphasized the
government's ongoing efforts to introduce measures facilitating the conduct of economic
activity
by
advocates. Marina
Nagornaya, Denis
Novak
razkazal
pro
budushye advokatskoe AO OOO [Denis Novak spoke about the future of advocate joint-stock
companies
and
LLCs],
NOVAYA
ADVOKATSKAYA
GAZETA
(Oct
10
2018), https://www.advgazeta.ru/novostinovosti/denis-novak-nazval-odnim-iz-glavnykhsobytiy-goda-aktivnoe-obsuzhdenie-proekta-kontseptsii/.
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was introduced in the Duma by deputy Pavel Krasheninnikov,
Chairman of the State Duma Committee on State Building and
Legislation and former Minister of Justice (1998 – 1999) under Boris
Yeltsin. The draft law essentially proposed a much more modest
reform, i.e. that representation in civil, administrative and arbitration
courts would require only a Russian law degree (or a foreign law degree
with passage of an examination by an association of jurists, the AllRussia Association of Lawyers ). 113 This proposed law did not address
the applicability to the unregulated sector of a code of ethics, discipline
for ethical breaches or legal privilege. It too appeared to be languishing
in the procedures of the Duma. 114
B.

Challenges to Reform

All of these successive attempts at reform have highlighted the
following central matters that must be addressed in any reform plan:
1. The definition of the parameters of the profession: extension
of the monopoly, to court representation and/or all other legal
services.
2. Modes of exercise, allowing the creation of limited liability
structures equivalent to partnerships or limited liability
companies, and related employment and taxation issues to allow
the structures of exercise to be competitive with the commercial
entities that jurists currently use.
3. Ensuring the provision of quality legal services on an
affordable basis to all citizens, particularly in light of the
constitutional right to legal assistance contained in Article 48 of
the Russian Constitution, and setting appropriate levels of
remuneration to be paid by the state to lawyers who provide legal
aid.
4. Transitional issues, particularly with respect to admission of
jurists with a certain number of years of experience.
5.

The question of in-house lawyers.

6. The need for all segments and sub-segments of the
profession, despite their extreme diversity, to “buy in” to the need
for reform and to participate fully in the process. In this respect the
113. See Draft law, On the Representation of Parties in Courts and on Amending Certain
Legislative
Acts
(Sept.
27,
2017),
http://sozd.parlament.gov.ru/bill/273154-7
[https://perma.cc/BQ3Z-R6J3].
114. Id.
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particular position of the offices of the international firms will
need to be addressed.

With this background as a starting point, we now present three
contrasting perspectives on the reform and its conduct.
III. THREE CONTRASTING PERSPECTIVES ON THE REFORM
A.

Achieve Consensus First and in the Meantime Reform the State
Apparatus (presented by Delphine Nougayrède)

When looking at the long series of attempts at reforming the
Russian legal profession, the first comment that comes to mind is that
it does not conform with the traditional representation of a forceful
Russian government imposing its will on a passive society. Rather, this
long process reveals the growing complexity of Russian society,
activism of certain circles within it and, uncharacteristically, a certain
cautious restraint that seems to have been adopted in this matter by the
government. While the objective of creating a well-regulated and
expanded legal profession is altogether unimpeachable, the manner of
achieving the desired result is just as important; the government’s
caution seems to show that it is aware of this fact and unwilling to force
through its reform. The objections that were provoked by all of the
successive Concept Papers in turn, by different groups within the legal
profession and for different reasons each time, show the difficulty of
introducing potentially exclusionary controls in segments of Russian
society that have, for the last twenty-five years, developed organically
outside of state intervention or control. The themes that I would
emphasize pertain to overall timing and process, as well as the
symmetrical reform that has emphatically not been embarked upon by
the government, i.e. that of the state-controlled components of the
justice system.
1. This reform is but a chapter in a wider systemic reform of the
Russian legal system, which will require substantial time
The 2014 Justice Program produced by the government was not a
novel initiative. It is a further iteration of the long-stated ambition of
Russian governments to reform and if possible improve the country’s
legal institutions. If one were to identify a single key difficulty
impeding this particular attempt at reform, it would be the perception
that it is driven mainly in the interests of a small segment of the
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profession, i.e. the advokatura, to the detriment of others. Generally, I
would argue that this proposed reform should not be imposed by the
government until it has been accepted by the majority of existing
practitioners. Not to lose any more time with its wider ambition of
improving the country’s legal system, however, the government should
devise an equally ambitious reform of the public justice and law
enforcement apparatus, whose roles for the rule of law are arguably
even more important and which, unlike the private professions, are
placed under its direct control.
2. Opposition to the reform has been widespread in the past, for very
different reasons that all had merit
Opposition to reform attempts over the years has included much
of the unregulated practitioners, some parts of the advokatura, 115 and
also, though for different reasons, NGOs and rights defenders. 116 The
opposition has also at times included various judges, 117 and according
to sources some parts of the government other than the Ministry of
Justice. 118 As was illustrated by the alternative 2017 bill introduced in
the Duma by one of the deputies from the ruling party, there is no
consensus. This is not surprising: although it concerned only 35,000
professionals or so at the time, 119 the 2002 Law on the Advokatura was
adopted after a full decade of discussion and confrontation. It
115. Opposition to earlier reforms was mainly because of absence of an entrance exam
(for example Mr. Reznik’s views cited below). Some individual advocates expressed the view
that the market was a good “tester” for unregulated practitioners. See interview of Nikolai
Kipnis, a member of the qualification commission of the Moscow Chamber of Advocates. See
Nikolai Kipnis, Nam ne nuzhno Ministerstvo Advokaturi [Nikolai Kipnis: We do not need a
Ministry
of
the
Advokatura]
MKRU
(June
11,
2014),
available
at
http://kavkaz.mk.ru/articles/2014/0606/11/nikolay-kipnis-nam-ne-nuzhno-ministerstvoadvokatury.html [https://perma.cc/Q9XS-9XP7].
116. See infra notes 137-40.
117. Judges from the Supreme Court and Intellectual Property Court publicly supported a
monopoly for advocates only at cassation or supervisory levels. Pochemu advokatskaya
monopoliya otkladivaetsya?, supra note 69.
118. Ekaterina Moyseeva & Timur Bocharov, Plyusi i minusi advokatsloy monopoli,
VEDOMOSTI (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2016/01/29/625981plyusi-minusi-advokatskoi-monopolii [https://perma.cc/68V3-G3YB]; Sofia Okun, Reforma ne
terpit sueti, KOMMERSANT (May 15, 2016), https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2987967.
[https://perma.cc/4STV-YGR3].
119. The figures cited by Jordan are 20,000 members in the Federal Union of Advocates
in 1997, representing the “historical” advokatura, and 13,000 in the Guild of Russian Advocates
in 2000, representing the parallel colleges. See JORDAN, supra note 2, at 73.
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eventually ended with a consensual merger of the competing groups
without any entry barriers or group exclusions being imposed on any
of their members.
Although the advokatura appears to unreservedly gain from the
proposed reform, its position has not been monolithic. The current
national leaders actively supported the reform from the outset, but there
was opposition in some of the regional chambers. 120 Previous
advokatura leaders and other advocates had been anxious to also
preserve certain dominant concepts (of legal “assistance” rather than
“services”) and existing forms of direct, un-intermediated practice of
law within the advokatura. Commercial practitioners being much more
numerous and operating along entirely different paradigms, some
leaders of the advokatura saw a risk of institutional destabilization of
their profession. To cite the views of Genry Reznik, a historical leader
of the Moscow bar and widely respected public figure:
I must admit that we are not very happy to accept a large army of
gentlemen, whose sense of belonging to the legal profession still
needs to be understood. We can only accept lawyers having
graduated [from law school] and only on the basis laid down in the
Law on Advokatura. Undoubtedly, these formerly free lawyers
newly joining the corporation of advocates will have their own
ideas about the practice of law, they will demand their own piece
of power in the bodies of legal self-governance. For us, it is a
headache.” 121

A second plank from the advokatura is that they did not support
the idea of a second regulated profession as a matter of principle. One
of the reasons for this, it would seem, is the (entirely legitimate) desire
to better share the burden of mandatory legal representation in criminal
matters, which is heavy, poorly remunerated and currently placed on
their shoulders only. But at the same time, the notion of the advokatura
becoming the basis for a single profession including all the commercial
practitioners is what drives the pressure to change traditional forms of
practice - thereby generating internal resistance.
120. Ekaterina Trifonova, Yuristi ssoryatsya iz-za zatyanuvsheysya reformi [Lawyers
quarrel over delayed reform], NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA (Oct. 14, 2018),
http://www.ng.ru/politics/2018-10-14/3_7331_reform.html
[https://perma.cc/4BPN-NJ74]
(reporting the fear in some regions that the reform will increase the powers of the Federal
Chamber of Advocates).
121. Advokatura ne ishet preferentsii, NOVAYA ADVOKATSKAYA GAZETA (Mar. 18,
2010), http://www.advgazeta.ru/rubrics/5/439.
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That the government too has rejected the option of a second
regulated profession is peculiar. From the standpoint of process, a dual
profession might, on the face of it, have been an easier solution in the
Russian context. Dual regulated professions exist in a number of
countries, including mature systems such as the United Kingdom,
where solicitors and barristers co-exist and are regulated separately. A
dual model was recently implemented in neighboring Kazakhstan,
which like Russia had a large unregulated professional segment.122 The
Russian government’s stated argument against a second profession is
that it does not believe that “self-regulating organizations” are able to
properly self-police themselves. 123 This reasoning was already present
in the 2008 bill and repeated in the Concept Papers: the perceived risk
is that “access to the [legal services] market [will be] given to
participants that only formally satisfy the established criteria.” 124 The
main advantage that the government sees in the advokatura is that it
already has its own rules of admission and professional conduct. Yet,
it is widely accepted (not only by unregulated practitioners) that selfpolicing within the advokatura is not fully satisfactory. 125 An
uncharitable view of the government’s position would be that it has
unquestioningly espoused the preferences of the national leaders of the
advokatura. It seems more likely, however, that the government is just
being pragmatic: the best can be the enemy of the good and it is simpler
to start from existing institutions rather than create new ones from
scratch. The failure of the unregulated profession to offer a structured
alternative proposal has also reduced the number of options on the
table. 126
122. Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan on the Activities of Advocates and Legal
Assistance
(July
5,
2018),
http://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=33024087
[https://perma.cc/4DPY4DPY-BNRK] (creating a new regulated profession of “legal
consultants” alongside advocates).
123. See supra Part II.A.4; supra note 92.
124. 2016 CONCEPT PAPER supra note 80, at 42, § 4.1 (Rus.).
125. See ICJ Report, supra note 2, at 67 (examining ‘pocket advocates’ and other such
phenomena) (cautioning that “these problems should not be confused with the issue of
unification, which should not be seen as a magical solution to every problem”).
126. Kazakhstan is an interesting point of comparison in this regard: the introduction there
of a second regulated profession (of “legal consultants”) was apparently facilitated by the fact
that these practitioners already had a representative organization, the “Kollegia Kommercheskikh
Yuristov” or “Kazakhstan Bar Association,” with its own rules of admission and conduct. On
the proposed formation of a voluntary organization by the unregulated professionals in Russia,
see infra Part III.C.
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There may be, in addition, a more hidden dimension to this reform
touching on the role of the state in the legal profession. In 2010, Mr.
Reznik’s words were that “we are talking not about the interests of the
advokatura, but about the interests of the state,” and “This initiative
does not come from us.” 127 In the 2016 Concept Paper, the government
counted as a positive the fact that “within the institutions of the
advokatura,” there is “equal representation of state and intraprofessional governance.” 128 Not surprisingly, the government is
expressing preference for an institution in which the state apparatus is
already embedded. 129 Seen from this angle, attempts to subordinate all
the unregulated practitioners to these organs can be interpreted as
expanding levers of executive or bureaucratic interference. Advocates
are accustomed to routinely dealing with state officials, not only in the
exercise of their principal mission of criminal defense but also in their
organs of self-governance. This is not the case for unregulated
practitioners, particularly in the commercial sector; these professionals
face much less interaction with the state bureaucracy and might even
be able to build entire careers avoiding it altogether. The desire of many
unregulated practitioners to maintain as much distance as possible from
the state apparatus surely explains some of the resistance, although for
evident reasons this concern is not always articulated by those
individuals who risk intervening in the public debate. 130
Opposition by unregulated practitioners to the successive Concept
Papers was expressed from the very onset. While a number of

127. Trifonova, supra note 120. These comments were in connection with the 2008 bill.
See supra Part II.A.1.
128. See 2016 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 80; supra Part IV.1. This argument (of “equal”
state representation) no longer appears in the 2017 Concept Paper.
129. The regional qualifications commissions controlling admission into the profession
and disciplinary proceedings comprise (in addition to seven advocates) two representatives of
the Ministry of Justice and two representatives of the regional legislature (as well as two judges).
See Law on Advokatura, supra note 19, art. 33(1). For Jordan, see supra note 2, the presence of
officials from outside the profession was a source of concern for its independence. See id. at
124.
130. For a provocative expression of this concern by a Russian lawyer practicing in
London, see Dmitry Gololobov, Advokatskaya Monopolya 2.0 ot FPA i AYuR: smertelnyi boy
agntsev s kozlichami, [Advocates’ Monopoly from FPA and Associattion of Russian Lawyers:
a Battle to the Death Between Lambs and Goats] (Oct. 30, 2017), https://legal.report/author20/advokatskaya-monopoliya-2.0-ot-fpa-i-ayur-smertelnyj-boj-agncev-s-kozlicshami
[https://perma.cc/K6LQ-KTS2].
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individuals and organizations spoke out, 131 there has not been any
unified organization or representation formulating a single collective
response. Within the ministerial working group, representatives of the
unregulated sector tended to come from in-house counsel, like the
Association of Corporate Lawyers (AKYuR), rather than from
unregulated law firms (and until the 2017 Paper, none of the foreign
firms were represented132). The sheer diversity of the unregulated
professionals meant that they were unable (or unwilling) to formulate
a structured alternative proposition, for example involving the creation
of a second regulated profession.
The views on the reform that were expressed by the NGO sector
and rights-defenders were based on an altogether different priority:
meeting the legal needs of under-privileged constituencies. One of the
idiosyncrasies of Russian legal development since the fall of the Soviet
Union is that non-criminal legal aid and public interest lawyering has
generally been handled not by advocates or legal practitioners, but by
the NGO sector. 133 This is in line with the historical Russian tradition
of representation in court not by lawyers (whether or not regulated), but
by trusted individuals. In many regions of the country, NGOs are often
the only available alternative to self-representation and the work may
131. See, e.g., Konstantin Dozhdev, Zhaloba v FAS RF ot Chlenov Mezhregional’noj
Obshhestvennoj Organizacii “Palata Sudebnyh Poverennyh” na Protivopravnye Dejstvija MJu
RF pri Realizacii Programmy “Justicija”, ZAKON (Dec. 19, 2016, 5:31 PM),
https://zakon.ru/discussion/2016/12/19/zhaloba_v_fas_rf_ot_chlenov_mezhregionalnoj_obsch
estvennoj_organizacii_palata_sudebnyh_poverennyh_na
[https://perma.cc/BMQ2-A54M]
(persuading the legal community to support a draft complaint written by the Interregional
Association of Court Representatives to protest the Ministry of Justice proposed reforms);
Evgeny Shestyakov, Konseptsia Izminilas’. Tchast’ L-aya, Povyesvuyushaya o Tom, Kak
Sovmestno Potrudnilis’ Yurbiznes i Advokatura Nad Proektom Konseptsii Reformi Rinka
Yurpomoshi i Shto iz Etogo Vishlo i Kakoi iz Etogo Sleduet Vivod, ZAKON (Dec. 2, 2015, 4:08
PM), https://zakon.ru/blog/2015/12/2/koncepciya_izmenilas_chastchast_1ya_povestvuyushhay
a_o_tomtom_kak_sovmestno_potrudilsya_yurbiznes_i_advokatu
[https://perma.cc/N9JNQAH6] (writing from the perspective of a managing partner of the GPK Intellect-S, arguing that
the reform proposed by the Ministry of Justice does not suit the Russian legal business); Evgeny
Shestyakov, Dolzhni-li Advokati Obladat’ Monopolyey na Yuruslugi?, PRAVO (Oct. 26, 2010),
https://pravo.ru/review/view/40979/ [https://perma.cc/9E2W-NS8B] (explaining that, when
discussing reform of the Russian legal profession, one may only talk about prospects and
consequences in an abstract way).
132. For the views of some of the foreign firms just before the 2017 Concept Paper, see
Chris Johnson, Is Reform Coming to the Russian Legal Market?, AM. LAW. (Jul. 28, 2017,
08:33PM33 PM), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1202793478216/Is-ReformComing-to-the-Russian-Legal-Market/ [https://perma.cc/Z7KT-YVNP].
133. See ICJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 12.
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involve NGO employees who never trained as lawyers. In 2015, the
Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights (one of the
organizations in the ministerial working group) commented that
whatever the reform of the advokatura, it would be necessary to
introduce legislation to
ensure that non-advocate forms of free legal assistance in court
provided by specialist rights defenders (parvozashitnikh
organizatsii) not having the status of advocates and not having a
higher legal education be maintained – on the condition that they
were not previously dismissed from professional legal
organizations (advokatura, notaries, employees of law
enforcement and judicial bodies). 134

Similar views were expressed by NGO representatives reacting to
the 2015 Concept Paper, when they pointed out that it did not formulate
any proposition to ensure access to non-criminal legal aid. 135 Human
rights advocates likewise opposed legislation requiring that individuals
appearing before the administrative courts should hold a law degree.136
In short, Russian human rights and public interest groups consistently
opposed all new restrictions on the right of non-lawyers to engage in
legal aid or pro bono work as a matter of principle.
These views were eventually heard by the government, which
excluded legal aid lawyering from the proposed monopoly in the 2017
Concept Paper. This exclusion is, of course, difficult to reconcile with
the stated objective of raising quality across the board (quality in legal
aid being no less important than in ‘paying’ legal services). Yet
allowing specialized NGOs to practice law outside of the regulated
134. SOVET PRI PREZIDENTE ROSSIYSKOY FEDERATSII PO RAZVITIYU GRAZHDANSKOGO
OBSHCHESTVA I PRAVAM CHELOVEKA [COUNCIL UNDER THE PRESIDENT OF THE RUSS. FED’N
FOR THE DEV. OF CIV. SOC’Y AND HUM. RTS..] (Aug. 18, 2015), http://president-

sovet.ru/documents/read/386/#table-of-contents [https://perma.cc/W85W-R6EE] (emphasis
added).
135. See, e.g., Dmitry Shabelnikov, Professionalnie Razgovori v Polzy Bednikh,
VEDOMOSTI (Apr. 3, 2016, 9:56 PM),
https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2016/04/03/636218636218-razgovori-bednih
[https://perma.cc/XB6T-DSD8] (explaining that the existing legal infrastructure prevents
lawyers from providing pro bono assistance to the poor).
136. See, e.g., Anastasia Kornia, Grazhdane Dolzhni Imet’ Pravo Zashishat’ Sami,
Schitaet Ella Pamfilova, VEDOMOSTI (Apr. 3, 2016, 11:22 PM),
https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2016politics/articles/2016/04/04/636257-grazhdanezaschischat-sebya [https://perma.cc/KW35-LMAH] (arguing that citizens should have the right
to represent themselves).
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profession correctly acknowledges the imperative of ensuring
sufficient access to law. It also shows that compromise is possible in
favor of those segments of the unregulated sector that are viewed as
particularly valuable.
There are some constitutional matters that also need addressing.
None of the successive Concept Papers have addressed the contrary
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court, which banned any advocate
monopoly on court representation in 2004 and has not to date reversed
its position. 137 In a reform whose stated aim is to improve the legal
system, this will need to be resolved. 138 Many important details of the
proposed reform also remain to be clarified, such the mode of passage
of mandatory entrance exams by all practitioners. Although this is
stated to be a simplified exam for the more experienced practitioners,
there are no exemptions and leading individuals from the unregulated
sector, some with twenty-five years of experience and very well
respected, will have to sit an exam. This will be a sensitive phase of the
reform. As a point of comparison, the 2002 Law on Advokatura did not
impose any entrance exams for pre-existing practitioners in the parallel
colleges. 139 Other countries having similarly merged pre-existing ‘less
regulated’ segments of the legal profession into that of full advocate
were only able to do so by foregoing potentially exclusionary entrance
examinations (France being one example). 140
3. The Real Priority is Elsewhere: To Reform the State Apparatus
In light of the conflicting views and interests (all of which have
their own merit), there is at least one area in which the government
could take useful action without delay, if indeed the goal is to improve
137. See Russian Federation of Collection of Legislation, supra note 17.
138. See Kipnis, supra note 115 (commenting on this jurisprudence).
139. Law on Advokatura, supra note 19, art. 40.1.
140. All registered French conseil juridiques automatically became members of the new
profession on the date of entry into force of the relevant law. Registration as a conseil juridique
required three years of experience. Loi 71-1130 du 31 décembre portant réforme de certaines
professions judiciaires et juridiques [Law 71-1130 of December 31, 1971 reforming certain
judicial and legal professions], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE] (Jan. 5, 1972), p. 131, art. 1. (Fr.). Another relevant
comparison may be that of Georgia (the former Soviet republic), where all practicing lawyers,
including the advocates, were required to take a new entrance examination (judges were also
entirely renewed by exam). See CHRISTOPHER P.M. WATERS, COUNSEL IN THE CAUCUSUS:
PROFESSIONALIZATION AND LAW IN GEORGIA 91–115 (W.B. Simons ed., 2004) (discussing
Georgian reform).
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the legal system and rule of law. The list of sources and commentary
on the systemic weaknesses of the Russian judiciary and law
enforcement is long (and not one reserved to Western commentary
alone). 141 Suffice to say that the Russian government itself proclaimed
the fight against “legal nihilism” and increasing citizens’ trust in the
legal system as main goals of reform since 2008. I would argue that the
foremost factor creating these problems is the behavior not of private
advocates, jurists, or legal practitioners, but of the state apparatus, e.g.,
the law enforcement agencies and in some cases the courts.
The advokatura is on the front line of these difficulties and has
been so for several decades. Its main occupation is criminal defense,
but in this mission, it is routinely thwarted. In fact, the argument can
be made that the difficulties routinely faced by advocates go a long way
to explain why unregulated professionals have never been interested in
seeking out the formal status of advocate, despite the legal protections
that it confers on paper. The most salient difficulty faced by advocates
is the routine disregard of client-attorney privilege, including through
the conduct of illegal searches. Another unfortunate practice is the
summoning of defense advocates as witnesses in their clients’ own
case. The sheer variety of violations of the formal rights of advocates
is described in recurring reports of the Federal Chamber of Advocates,
as for example the latest report for the period 2015-2016:
In the period between the [2015 and 2017] Congresses, 1592
violations of the professional rights of advocates were registered
by the [regional RF] chambers. . . . During the reporting period, 6
advocates died in connection with their professional activities. 8
advocates suffered harm to their health. Infringements on
advocate-client confidentiality increased by 60% (from 367 in the
previous reporting period to 603 in this one). The most common
141. For Russian commentary see, e.g., Vadim Volkov and Aryna Dzmitriyeva,
Recruitment Patterns, Gender, and Professional Subcultures of the Judiciary in Russia, 22 INT’L
J. LEGAL PROF. 166, 173, 186 (2015) (determining that the largest supplier of judges is the
support apparatus of courts, e.g., assistants, secretaries, and clerks, followed by the prosecution
service and other law enforcement organizations, and concluding that the existing patterns of
recruitment have affected the professional culture of the judiciary by strengthening conformity,
legalism, and formal bureaucratic orientations); see also Vladimir Rimskii, Bribery and the
Judiciary, 51 RUSS. L. & POL. 40 (2013) (discussing corruption in the judiciary and concluding
that “judicial reform has made bribery more widespread in the Russian courts, with business
people the main target of extortion.”). As regards Western commentary, the literature is
voluminous. For a somewhat sanguine view on Russian courts and the rule of law, see, e.g.,
Kathryn Hendley, “Telephone Law” and the “Rule of Law”: the Russian Case, 1 HAGUE J. ON
THE RULE OF L. 241 (2009).
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violations were the summons of advocates for questioning as
witnesses in the criminal case of the defendant, and the conduct of
illegal searches in the office (or residential) premises of advocates.
These two types of unlawful actions vis-a-vis advocates amounted
to 47.0% of the total number of violations of advocate-client
confidentiality . . . . The number of illegal searches of office or
residential premises of advocates was not reduced. There were 44
such cases before the previous Congress, and 42 in the last two
years. Obstruction or interference in the activity of advocates
continued by means of hiding the location of defendants or
refusing access to defendants under various pretexts (obsolete
form of the advocate certificate, lack of written permission of the
investigator, lack of free premises for meetings with defendants,
and other pretexts). The number of refusals received by advocates
seeking meetings with defendants increased by 63% and amounted
to 198 (in the previous reporting period there were 134 such
violations). There was no significant reduction in illegal operativeinvestigative searches against advocates. In the previous reporting
period, there were 37 illegal cases of such measures, in this period
- 31 cases . . . . On 4 February 2015, a court illegally convicted
advocate of the Chamber of Advocates of the Republic of
Khakassia V.G. Dvoryak for divulging preliminary investigation
data which had already been made public by other sources. . . . 142

Similar reports have been issued by the Federal Chamber every two
years since 2007. 143 The upshot is that if serious changes are indeed
necessary within the justice system, it might be reasonable to focus on
the state apparatus itself. 144 All of these problems are Soviet legacies
that have yet to be overcome. They are one reason why the advokatura
is organized the way it is, that is, in chambers of independent
practitioners who provide not legal “services” but legal “assistance” to
individuals as a constitutional right (Article 48 of the Constitution).
142. Otčet o Dejatelʹnosti Soveta FPA RF za Period s Aprelja 2015 g. po Aprelʹ 2017 g,
FEDERAL’NAJA PALATA ADVOKATOV RF [Otchet o Deyatelnosti Sovyeta FPA RF za Period s
Aprely],
FEDERALNAYA
PALATA
ADVOKATOV
RF
(Apr.
19,
2017),
http://fparf.ru/documents/council_documents/council_reports/37679/ [https://perma.cc/5ZEXH5PF].
143. Id.
144. Another problem often cited by commentators like Mr. Reznik, is that of the very low
rate of acquittals in the criminal court system. He attributes this fact to the mindset of criminal
judges, many of whom are either junior judges or former employees of the law enforcement
bodies. According to him, these individuals simply do not accept the principle of presumption
of innocence. See Reznik, supra note 117.
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The Concept Papers downplay the distinction between legal “services”
and legal “assistance” and write that it is entirely possible to reconcile
these legal categories. This is surely true in theory, but if nothing else,
the historical advokatura’s defense of its preferred concept of nonentrepreneurial legal “assistance” rather than “services” shows that it
deeply values its culture of rights-defense of citizens against the state.
Given the historical legacy and institutional challenges in the country,
this professional culture and sense of identity must surely be preserved
and nurtured rather than denigrated or diluted. 145
The advokatura’s self-image also explains why some advocates
had difficulty accepting that advocates may in the future work within
law firms in a position of subordination under employment agreements,
and that retainer contracts be signed by law firms not individual
advocates. As Mr. Reznik explained in the past,
responsibility towards clients at the end of the day must be borne
by the advocate, because only the advocate, and not a legal
structure, can perform the activity of an advocate. There is no legal
firm present in a court, there is no legal firm in the relationship
with a client. Even if the client signs an agreement with a firm, the
work is performed by a concrete individual. And these concrete
individuals are those who must bear individual responsibility visà-vis the clients. 146

There is a simple human logic to this vision of a direct, unintermediated advocate-client relationship in a criminal system where
defendants face negligible chances of success against a far more
powerful adversary. The culture and practices of the commercial
profession are entirely different. It is an entrepreneurial profession that
flourished during the high growth 2000s, has little in common with the
traditional defense bar and spends most of its efforts facilitating
transactions between legal entities rather than defending individuals
against the state. Contrary to the criminal bar, the commercial law
profession has not generated many outspoken individuals who risk
145. On the relations between the advokatura and law enforcement, see Kazun Anton
Pavlovich, Polozhenia Rossiskikh Advokatov v Pravookhranitelnikh Systemie: Mezhdu
Kooperatsiei i Protivosostayaniem, in XVI APRILSKAYA MEZHDUNARODNAYA NAUTCHNAYA
KONFERENTSIYA PO PROBLEMAM RASZVITIYA EKONOMIKI I OBSCHESTVA 793–802 (E.G.
Yasin ed., 2016), https://publications.hse.ru/chapters/180542779. The author concludes that the
advokatura community encourages those advocates who resist the law enforcement system,
while it marginalizes those advocates who prefer to cooperate. This is surely a valuable feature
of the current advokatura.
146. See Advokatura ne ishet preferentsii, supra note 121.
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intervening in the public debate. Again, the existence of differing
professional cultures would appear to have militated for a second
regulated profession, which could have operated with its own rules of
practice, meanwhile allowing the rights-defense culture of the current
advokatura to continue unaffected. This second profession could have
been placed under the firm obligation to contribute, financially, to the
burden of mandatory criminal representation that is currently
shouldered by the advokatura alone.
4. To What Extent Were Foreign Analogies Fully Analyzed?
As was previously indicated, the Concept Papers include a
comparative review of lawyer regulations in selected foreign
jurisdictions, being Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Japan,
Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Estonia, India and the People’s Repulic
of China. 147 The analysis that is conducted is very cursory, however. It
focuses mainly on the advocate (or barrister) segment of the domestic
professions. Little attention is paid to the existence of dual professions
and unregulated sectors of practice in many of these countries (e.g., the
United Kingdom, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Estonia or the People’s
Republic of China). 148 The model ultimately favored by the Concept
Papers (of a single advokatura profession with a full monopoly) seems
to be closer to the German, Indian, French and Japanese models, which
are those with the highest entry barriers. This may have been necessary
to win over the advocates (or their national leadership), but it is unclear
that the model is a desirable one for Russia in the short term in light of
its current circumstances (weak rule of law, small number of advocates,
high volume of court cases, divided practitioners with differing
professional cultures).
The point is often made that Russia finds itself in a position that
is unique. In fact, there appear to be other countries with large
contingents of unregulated legal practitioners (Mexico for example).
147. See generally Laurel S. Terry, Putting the Legal Profession’s Monopoly on the
Practice of Law in a Global Context, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2903 (2014) (concerning the perils
of international comparisons).
148. While the ICJ report is favorable to the idea of unifying the Russian profession, it
also points out that this is not a universal model, saying “[i]n a number of jurisdictions, members
of the bar association have a monopoly on the provision of legal advice and/or legal
representation in court. However, in other jurisdictions lawyers enjoy monopoly only over
representation in courts, or there could be no monopoly at all.” ICJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 60.
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Situations such as these can be explained by the singular circumstances
and history of each country. One might also note, with some academic
scholars, that the existence of a monopoly is not necessarily equivalent
to greater quality 149 and that in certain circumstances regulations can
be used to protect not the general public but the interests of incumbents
or groups able to influence their design. 150
5. A Word on the Position of Foreign Lawyers
Both the 2008 draft law and 2014 Justice program were placed
under the headline banner of fighting ‘legal nihilism’, reducing
corruption and enhancing the quality of the legal system. These are
unimpeachable motives. Already in the 2008 draft, however, there were
signs that the government also had in mind controls over the activities
of foreign lawyers and wished to reciprocate the practices of certain
foreign countries. In the introductory report to the draft law, 151 it was
written that
Current legislation does not include any qualification requirements
for foreign lawyers, who are active in Russia and provide services
on Russian law [ . . . ]. This not only does not correspond to the
interests of society and the state, but it also places Russian lawyers
in a difficult situation, for they are always subject to very strict
standards in foreign countries. 152

The authors pointed out, tellingly, that this “harmed the prestige
of Russia in the international arena.” 153 The most recent version of the
Concept Paper (2017) reiterates this concern on the position of foreign
lawyers or law firms, indirectly linking them to “threats to national
security.” 154 Not surprisingly, this language went on to trigger the
somewhat fevered collective response of international law firms that
was described above.

149. See Terry, supra note 147 (pointing out that “[a]though there is some information
available that links regulation to quality, there appears to be very little reliable empirical
evidence that examines the relationship between the lawyer’s monopoly and issues of quality
and access.”).
150. See infra Part III.C. and accompanying notes. See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, Lawyer SelfRegulation and the Public Interest: A Reflection, 20 LEGAL ETHICS 115 (2017)
151. Vestnik, supra note 73, at 42-47.
152. Vestnik, supra note 73, at 43.
153. Vestnik, supra note 73, at 47.
154. See supra Part II.A.5; Letter on behalf of 30 international law firms with offices in
Russia to Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (Dec. 7, 2017) (on file with authors).
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Several remarks seem appropriate here. First, this language does
reveal objectives other than the concern for quality, and seem to have
a political dimension. Yet at the same time, it seems entirely
appropriate that the Russian government should wish to nurture its
domestic legal profession, a policy that has after all been pursued for
decades by countries such as China, India or Brazil. Restrictions over
foreign practitioners and foreign law firms also exist in many Western
countries. International law firms have generally been very adept at
managing these kinds of regulations and there is no reason to believe
that they could not achieve the same in Russia. The Russian offices of
international law firms are now staffed mostly by Russian lawyers and
partners; these firms will have the internal skills and resources to adapt
(including through various forms of contractual arrangements in the
event foreign shareholding is restricted). The foreign or international
firms should not be the concern here, as it is unlikely that they will be
helpless or most adversely affected by the reform. The priority should
be to achieve consensus with the large number of Russian-originated
domestic firms that currently practice in the unregulated sector,
including in regions other than Moscow and Saint Petersburg where the
international firms have never been present.
In conclusion, this is a highly ambitious reform, which aims to
transform existing forms of private practice in the country, not only for
the unregulated practitioners but also for the existing advokatura.
Perhaps it is too ambitious. For it to succeed, the government should
take care to ensure sufficient stakeholder consensus, and for this it may
be necessary to water down some of the reform’s exclusionary aspects
(in particular the imposition of an exam on all existing unregulated
practitioners including the most experienced). The need for stakeholder
buy-in should be viewed not as a concession to vested interests or
change-resistant groups, but because an independent and self-regulated
legal profession is a core element not only of the legal system but of
democratic society. The current unregulated sector of private
practitioners grew organically over twenty-five years to become an
integral part of the existing system. This may be unusual, but it is
explained by Russia’s specific circumstances. Throughout this period
the Russian judiciary and law enforcement continued to manifest
significant weaknesses, which arguably represent the greatest order of
priority if the system is to improve. The Russian advokatura, for its
part, has historically focused on rights-defense of citizens against the
state and has organized itself in light of that mission. It continues to
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face serious challenges when performing its core function; these
challenges are a key area of professional concern for it and explain why
many advocates value their traditional mode of organization. These
same challenges explain why the unregulated law profession never
sought to obtain any of the formal privileges theoretically afforded to
advocates. None of this is likely to change if there is no improvement
in the functioning of the state apparatus.
B. Pursue the Proposals of the Ministry of Justice for a Unified
Profession (Presented by Gayane Davidyan and Thomas McDonald)
1. The 2017 Concept Paper is a Realistic First Step
We start from the proposition that the current situation of a
fragmented and largely unregulated legal profession is untenable.
Russia is currently in an unenviable, unique and retrograde position of
having the majority of its lawyers unregulated, subject to no admission
or continuing education requirements, no ethical rules, no discipline for
misconduct, and not benefiting from legal (attorney-client) privilege.
The 2017 Concept Paper outlines a proposal for a unified, reformed
profession with an expanded monopoly on the provision of qualified
legal services. It is a well argued, coherent and persuasive blueprint for
the reform of the Russian legal profession which clearly identifies the
abuses and dangers of the current system. Significant problems will
need to be overcome before any reform based on the Concept is
realized. As discussed below, we believe that some of these problems
are resolvable but some are more difficult. And we have two overriding
concerns about any proposal to reform the legal profession in Russia:
First, any proposal to regulate the legal profession should not
unduly diminish access to justice by those least able to afford the
services of a regulated profession where the monopoly effect will
decrease numbers and increase costs. In this respect we are encouraged
by the recognition in the 2017 Concept Paper of the right of human
rights NGOs to continue to provide legal services (including court
representation) without being part of the new profession. Moreover,
there is special emphasis placed in the 2017 Concept Paper to the
importance of improving the law on free legal aid and encouraging pro
bono practice. 155

155. 2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, art. IV, §§ 6.1–6.2.
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Secondly, the importance of self-regulation of the new profession,
particularly with respect to admission requirements, formulation of
ethical rules and disciplinary sanctions cannot be too highly stressed.
There is certainly language in the 2017 Concept Paper that indicates
that the Ministry recognizes this concern.
It is however necessary to recognize what the reform proposed by
the 2017 Concept Paper will not do. There are very real concerns,
expressed by Delphine, with respect to challenges to the rule of law
posed by the inadequacies of the law enforcement agencies and the
court system in Russia today. 156 The systemic deficiencies of the state
apparatus which she identifies are real, and the current proposals
contained in the Concept paper indeed do not address those issues.
But shall we do nothing and expectantly hope for a better day
when there is a genuine transformation of the law enforcement agencies
and the courts, and in the meantime to allow the non-regulated legal
services providers to find a way on their own to correct the serious
problems of unqualified practitioners, unethical conduct and lack of
legal privilege? It is illusory to think that this can be done without the
direct involvement of the State, and unrealistic to put off the chance of
a reform (however incremental) in the hope that one day there will be
a more fundamental change to the state apparatus.
The legal system in Russia today is built on the ruins of the Soviet
system and the chaos that followed its collapse. The total reformation
of the normative legal rules that followed has resulted in modern and
sophisticated legal codes covering all aspects of a new and coherent
legal system. But these normative rules do not exist in a vacuum: the
well-crafted rules are applied in the context of systematic state
interference by and with the law enforcement agencies and the courts,
compounded by corruption at all levels. This is a legacy not only of the
Soviet system but a consistent problem throughout Russian history.
The first step to the rule of law is to have written rules that clearly
state equitable principles. We should grasp the opportunity to establish
the framework for an independent, self-regulating and inclusive legal
profession as an incremental step, recognizing that the overall goal of
the rule of law and access to justice will not itself be achieved by the
adoption of this reform. But it is a first step.

156. See supra, Part III.A; ICJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 5.
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2. The Role of the Ministry of Justice and Opposition to the Reform
The 2017 Concept Paper is (as already noted) the latest in a series
of efforts of the government to address the need for reform. It is
nonetheless important to emphasize that the current efforts are based
on the government Justice decree of 2014, which mandates the Ministry
to propose legislation to reform the legal profession. While the
Ministry established a working group composed of representatives of
various sectors of the profession to comment and advise on the reform,
it is clear that the primary impetus for the reform is at the ministerial
level.
Moreover, there has been opposition to the reform from some
members of the advokatura, the unregulated sector and the NGO/rights
defenders. It is highly relevant to note that the basis for some of this
opposition is self-interest. Some advocates seek to defend their own
concepts of legal practice and traditions. The unregulated jurists have
been conspicuous by their indifference (particularly notable among the
international firms with offices in Russia) and occasional
uncoordinated complaints. But the 2017 Concept Paper clearly
excludes the in-house lawyers and the NGO/rights defenders from a
reformed profession, permitting them to continue to provide legal
services outside of the profession, so the in-house lawyers and the
NGOs should no longer object to the reform.
It is in fact highly appropriate that the reform of the profession
should be initiated by the Ministry of Justice, not only in light of the
governmental decree requiring it to do so, but because any consensual
reform in the context of the self-interest and indifference of some of
the parties concerned is unlikely. Moreover, it is important to recognize
that Russia, as a civil law jurisdiction, has much more in common with
the European approach to the regulation of the profession than the
United States or England. In civil law jurisdictions, the creation and
regulation of the legal profession is primarily based on legislative acts
and government decrees, and then by delegation to bar councils who
have normative authority over membership of the profession,
elaboration of ethical codes and discipline. One of the critical rights of
a regulated profession is legal (attorney-client) privilege, and, unlike in
the United States where the attorney-client privilege is a part of the law
of evidence and has evolved out of the requirements of the adversarial
system, such a right can only be established by legislative act in civil
law jurisdictions. Accordingly, any voluntary bar association of elite
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jurists in Russia (as suggested by Susan) 157 would necessarily lack one
of the most important characteristics of a regulated profession.
3. The Importance of Self-Regulation and the Relevance of the
Advokatura as the Basis for the Reform
As noted above one of the essential characteristics of a unified
regulated profession is self-regulation. The United States has a long
tradition of self-regulation, developed through state bar associations
over several hundred years. In civil law jurisdictions, the regulation of
the legal professions is generally the domain of the legislature and
governmental decrees, but nonetheless the principle of self-regulation
over admission, ethical codes and discipline is typically delegated to
the bar itself. Indeed, one of the core principles of the European legal
profession, elaborated by the Councils of Bars and Law Societies of
Europe, is self-regulation. 158
The advokatura is a well-established institution with clear
legislative support for its independence and self-governance. 159 In
particular, the 2003 Code of Ethics of Russian Advocates was
formulated and is periodically modified by the National Congress of
Russian Advocates. The regulation of admission qualifications and
discipline for violation of the Code of Ethics is in the domain of the
Federal and/or regional chambers of Advocates. As noted by the ICJ
Mission Report, “Under the law, the powers of both the federal and
regional chambers are comprehensive and in line with international
standards of the independence of the legal profession.” 160
There are of course serious concerns about how this selfregulation and independence work in practice, either due to violations
of the rights of advocates by the state, or by the advokatura’s own laxity
in enforcing its ethical rules. Without diminishing the importance of
these concerns, it is nonetheless important to note that the principle of
independence and self-governance of the advokatura is incorporated
157. See infra, Part III.C.
158. See COUNCIL OF BARS & LAW SOC’YS OF EUR., CHARTER OF CORE PRINCIPLES OF
THE EUROPEAN LEGAL PROFESSION, COUNCIL OF BARS AND L. SOCIETIES OF EUR. & CODE
OF CONDUCT FOR EUROPEAN LAWYERS (2018), available at https://www.ccbe.eu/fileadmin/
speciality_distributiondistribution/public/documents/DEONTOLOGY/DEON
DEONTOLOGY/DEON_CoC/EN_DEON_CoC.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZKE7-KXU3] (listing
one of the principles as “the self-regulation of the legal profession”).
159. See ICJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 24.
160. See ICJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 24.
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into the 2017 Concept Paper as an essential base for the reformed
profession. The 2017 Concept Paper considers the possibility of
establishing a parallel self-regulating institution for the currently
unregulated part of the profession, but instead opts for a single
institution based on the advokatura, due to its established traditions of
self-governance. Delphine expresses the concern that the Ministry’s
choice is based on a “preference for an institution with which it is
already familiar and in which the state apparatus is embedded”. 161 It
is nonetheless relevant to note that any new self-regulating institution
in Russia would be established under the Federal Law on SelfRegulating Organizations 162 pursuant to which the activities of any
self-regulating organization is subject to state control through the
relevant ministry. The establishment of a new self-regulating
institution for the currently unregulated part of the profession would
accordingly not diminish her concerns about state interference.
Regardless of whether there is a unitary profession based on the
advokatura or a new parallel profession of jurists, the extension of the
principle of self-governance to the entire profession is an essential goal.
As noted by the ICJ Report, it is important to ensure that the reform
process does not lead to a dilution of the independence of its institutions
of governance. Although the ICJ’s meetings with the Ministry of
Justice and the Federal Chamber of Lawyers did not suggest any
measures to erode the principle of self-governance were under
consideration, it will be crucial that the reform measures are carefully
scrutinized to ensure that they do not, whether by accident or design,
restrict the independence of the profession. 163
4. The “Non-Entrepreneurial”/ “Commercial” Divide
Some critics of the Concept from the advokatura have expressed
concern that the “non-entrepreneurial” nature of an advocate’s
activity 164 is incompatible with the perceived commercial nature of the
161. See supra Part III.A.2 at note 129.
162. See Federal Law on Self-Regulatory Organizations, supra note 93, No. 315-F; see
also Rasporiazheniia Pravitelʹstva Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Decree of the Russian Federation on
Improving Self-Regulatory Mechanisms], SOBRANIE ZAKONODATEL’STVA ROSSIISKOI
FEDERATSII [SZ RF] [Russian Federation Collection of Legislation],] 2015, No. 2276-r (2015)
(Russ.).
163. ICJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 65.
164. See Law on Advokatura, supra 19, art. 1, ¶ 2.
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practice of jurists. The ICJ Report notes that this principle is “seen as a
fundamental ethical principle which enables members of advokatura to
serve the interests of justice and defines the collegial spirit and ideals
of advocates,” while expressing difficulty in understanding how this
principle is compatible with the fact that advocates, like non-regulated
jurists, expect to make a profit from their activities. 165 This may be
more a question of semantics than substance, as recognized by the 2017
Concept paper, 166 and the paper suggests that it can be solved by
adapting existing commercial forms to “lawyer formations”
specifically adapted to legal activity, to be elaborated when the relevant
legislation is drafted.
In our view, a reformed and unified legal profession should
clearly preserve the real value of the principle that its activities
(whether in the criminal defense of individuals or in providing advice
to commercial clients) are essentially non-entrepreneurial. In this
respect an analogy with France may be helpful: in common with many
European legal systems the legal profession in France is defined by law
as “liberal and independent,” 167 specifically stating that the legal
profession is incompatible with all activities of a commercial nature.168
Although a French lawyer may practice law through various types of
entities, including commercial corporations, 169 the practice of law is
165. ICJ REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
166. 2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81, at § 5.3.
167. Loi 71-1130, supra note 140, at art. 1. Loi 71-1130 du 31 décembre portant réforme
de certaines professions judiciaires et juridiques [Law 71-1130 of December 31, 1971 reforming
certain judicial and legal professions], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Jan. 5, 1972, p. 131, art. 1 (Fr.).
168. Décret 91-1197 du 27 novembre 1991 organisant la profession d’avocat [Decree 911197 of Nov. 27, 1991 Organizing the Profession of Law], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], (Nov. 28, 1991), art. 111 (Fr.).
169. Various professional corporations and associations are permitted by Loi 66-879 du
29 novembre 1991 relative aux sociétés civiles professionnelles [Law 66-879 of Nov. 29, 1966
on Professional Civil Societies], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Nov. 30, 1966, art. 124; (Fr.); Loi 90-1258 du 31 décembre
1990 relative à l’exercice sous forme de sociétés des professions libérales soumises à un statut
législatif ou réglementaire ou dont le titre est protégé et aux sociétés de participations financières
de professions liberals [Law 90-1258 of Dec. 31, 1990 on the Exercise in the Form of
Companies of Liberal Professions Subject to a Statutory or Regulatory Status or Whose Title is
Protected and to Companies of Financial Participation of Liberal Professions], JOURNAL
OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE]; and, Jan. 5,
1991 (Fr.); Décret 91-1197, at du 27 novembre 1991 organisant la profession d’avocat [Decree
91-1197 of Nov. 27, 1991 organizing the Profession of Law], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA
REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS [J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], Nov. 28, 1991, art. 124. (Fr.).
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nonetheless considered to be “liberal” (i.e. professional) and noncommercial, notwithstanding the legal form chosen. This means that
the lawyer, regardless of the structure of exercise, remains bound by
the rules of ethics of the legal profession and remains personally liable
for his own acts.
In the context of the proposal to reform the Russian profession,
we believe that the non-entrepreneurial nature of the profession should
be preserved and extended, understood to mean that all members of the
profession will be bound by rules of ethics and that each individual
lawyer remains liable for his own acts, regardless of the structure
chosen for the collective exercise of the profession. In a unified
profession, bound by rules of ethics and where personal liability for
individual action is maintained, all professionals would be deemed to
be providing qualified legal assistance (“pomosh”) rather than some
commercial service (“uslugi”) devoid of ethical constraints. To achieve
this, we believe that the reformed profession can permit lawyers to use
commercial entities for the practice of law, but such entities must be
adapted to provide for the liability of the lawyer for his own acts. Such
structures would accordingly preserve the essential “nonentrepreneurial” aspect of the profession and respond clearly to the
concern expressed by Genry Reznik referred to by Delphine that
“concrete individuals are those who must bear individual responsibility
vis a vis the clients.” 170 The cultural divide identified by Delphine
based on the traditions of the advokatura and the current so called
commercial profession is not as deep as all that. It simply requires that
any structure approved for the practice of law conforms to the essential
principle of the liability of a lawyer for his own acts, including ethical
obligations. This should not be a particular difficulty for the large firms
of jurists familiar with the widespread use of professional corporations
and limited liability partnerships in other jurisdictions. In our view it is
essential to preserve the essential wisdom of the incompatibility of the
profession with commercial activity.

Some commercial entities are permitted by Loi 2015-990 du 6 août 2015 pour la croissance,
l’activité et l’égalité des chances économiques [Law 2015-990 of Aug. 6, 2015 for Growth,
Activity and Equal Economic Opportunities, JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE FRANÇAIS
[J.O.] [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], (Aug. 7, 2015), art. 63. (Fr.).
170. Supra Part III.A.1 at note 146.
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5. Should “in House Lawyers” Be Excluded from the Reformed
Profession?
The inclusion of “in-house” lawyers in a reformed profession
raises difficulties that are not unique to Russia. As noted above, many
European jurisdictions do not permit in house lawyers to be members
of the regulated profession due to concerns about their lack of
independence and the particular difficulties of extending to them the
same legal professional privilege enjoyed by lawyers in private
practice 171. It is important to underscore that legal privilege, as
understood in Europe, is significantly broader than the concepts of
attorney-client privilege and the related protection of attorney work
product in the United States. In the United States these rights are
limited to specific documents or advice, objectively defined in the law
of evidence and procedure as determined by the courts, and their
application to in-house lawyers (who are members of the bar) is well
defined and understood. In contrast, in Europe, legal privilege is
generally defined as an all-encompassing right, co-extensive with the
lawyer’s unlimited duty of confidentiality and accordingly
significantly greater than the attorney-client privilege/work-product
doctrine in the United States. It is a consequence of the emphasis placed
on the independence of the European lawyer, in contrast to the role of
the lawyer in a common law system. 172 Accordingly, many European
jurisdictions struggle with the idea that such a broad definition of legal
privilege should be extended to an in-house lawyer who is an employee
and subordinate – by definition not independent. The existing
profession of advocate in Russia has, like most European jurisdictions;
a broadly defined concept of professional privilege, co-extensive with
the duty of confidentiality, and it similarly places great emphasis on the
independence of the advocate.173
The resolution of this issue (in Russia as elsewhere) could require
a special and less-extensive definition of legal privilege to be created
for in-house lawyers, as well as other significant adjustments to the
ethical rules which are based on the principle of independence. These
issues are difficult, and their resolution complicates any chances of
reforming and unifying the external practitioners. For this reason, we
171. 2017 CONCEPT PAPER, supra note 81.
172. See Professional Legal Ethics: A Comparative Perspective, in AM. BAR ASS’N:
CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN LAW INITIATIVE 4–5, 10–11 (Maya Goldstein Bolocan
ed. 2002).
173. See ETHICS CODE, supra note 23, at art. 5–6.
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believe that the exclusion of in-house lawyers from the reform at this
stage is a sensible and practical position.
6. The Relevance of Foreign Models
The 2017 Concept Paper gives an overview of the regulation of
the legal systems in a few selected countries. 174 Rather than question
the relevance of these comparisons due to the specificity of the Russian
system, we take the view that it is entirely appropriate to seek
inspiration from the regulation of the profession elsewhere, particularly
in civil law jurisdictions. Russia has a legal system that is part of the
civilian tradition, and the models for the excellent civil and commercial
codes of Russia (among other normative acts) enacted since the
collapse of the Soviet Union are essentially inspired adaptations of
foreign law. Similarly, the 2002 Law on Advokatura and the 2003 Code
of Ethics show clear inspiration from European models. In our view it
makes great sense to see how other jurisdictions have addressed the
problem of regulation of the profession, and to adapt the solutions
reached to the particularities of Russia. 175
C. Organize an Elite Voluntary Bar Association to Develop a
Voluntary Ethics Code (Presented by Susan Carle)
In debating the future of legal profession reform in Russia, some
comparative historical perspective may be helpful. I thus offer some
brief observations based on the history of the United States legal
profession. Of course the situation in the Russian Federation is very
different, and I certainly do not mean to suggest that Russia should
follow in the footsteps of the United States. As Russian lawyers ponder
where to go next, however, some comparative perspective may be
relevant.
If the Concept proposals do not succeed in becoming law, or even
if they are adopted, further steps toward deeper reform clearly will also
be necessary, as Delphine points out above. I propose below that
forming a voluntary association of elite jurists who wish to develop and
174. See supra Part II.A.4.
175. We have written elsewhere about the relevance to the reform of the Russian legal
profession of the French experience in the creation of a unified profession with an extensive
monopoly for the provision of legal services. See generally Gayane Davidyan & Thomas
McDonald, Legal Consulting in Russia: On the Threshold of Reform, ZAKON 82 (2017); Thomas
McDonald, La Réforme des Professons Judiciaires et Juridiques en Russie, 135 GAZETTE DU
PALAIS 2908, 2908–10 (2015).
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agree to abide by a code of highest ethical practices, and also to
advocate for and defend strong rule of law, could be a fruitful
development that could contribute to promoting a strong and
independent legal profession.
It is easy to forget today that, in the early stages of nation building
in the United States, the legal profession was almost completely
unregulated. The process of developing regulation happened gradually.
At the early stages, developing ethical standards occurred largely
outside the realm of government supervision. The first national bar
association, the American Bar Association (ABA), was voluntary in
nature. The ABA was founded in 1878, in a period of great flourishing
of civil society. 176 This last quarter of the nineteenth century especially
saw the formation of new voluntary national associations addressing a
wide variety of concerns and interests. 177 The ABA was one of many
such new organizations. In its first decades, the ABA sought to attract
only the elite members of the bar. It sought to distinguish these “best”
members of the bar from the “riff raff,” as its members saw them. Those
it regarded as among this riff raff included lawyers of color, women,
and recent immigrants, a shameful aspect of the ABA’s early history
that should not be overlooked. 178 But some aspects of this history might
bear on Russia’s situation in more helpful ways.
Like all voluntary associations, the ABA devoted itself to
promoting the interests of its members. Chief among the interests it
defined as priorities were such matters as raising the standards for bar
admissions and legal education. 179 The ABA’s motives in taking on
these issues were two-fold. On one level, as the ABA repeatedly
expressed, it sought to protect clients from bad actors and thus to ensure
the integrity of the legal profession. On another level, the ABA’s
motives were less altruistic. Raising the standards for bar admission
and legal education had the effect of raising what economists call
“barriers to entry”—i.e., “higher” standards meant fewer people could

176. John A. Matzko, The Early Years of the American Bar Association, 1878-1928, at 1
(Aug. 1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia,), available at
https://libraetd.lib.virginia.edu/public_view/rf55z782m [https://perma.cc/NJF7-337A].
177. See CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, THE STATE AND THE UNIONS: LABOR RELATIONS,
LAW, AND THE ORGANIZED LABOR MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (Louis Galambos & Robert E.
Gallman, eds. 1985).
178. See ABEL, supra note 59, at 100.
179. See MATZKO, supra note 176, at 297-98.
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enter the profession. 180 Thus calling for higher standards amounted to
a type of monopoly protecting activity. 181 As Rick Abel has
emphasized in his important work on the legal profession, raising
barriers to entry into the profession helped ensure that the elite bar did
not face competition for business from less elite bar members. By
keeping the numbers of lawyers small, the elite bar ensured their ability
to charge high prices for legal services, thus preserving their privileged,
protected status as a professional elite. 182
The ABA sought to develop legal ethics standards for the practice
of law as well. 183 Again, dual motives drove its energies in
promulgating a first national legal ethics code in 1908, which it called
the Canons of Professional Ethics. On the one hand, unethical
charlatans most certainly did damage both the interests of clients and
the integrity of the legal system. On the other hand, the matters focused
on in the ABA’s first ethics code tended to single out for condemnation
such matters as the client-gathering practices of less elite lawyers. The
bar committees that later applied these rules then tended to do so
primarily against “lower-class” members of the bar, as others and I
have written about elsewhere.184
The ABA’s 1908 Canons were precatory; in other words, they
admonished practitioners about what they “should” do. 185 There was
nothing about a voluntary organization’s drafting of an ethics code for
its members that gave the Canons force of law. Courts looked to the
ABA Canons as an authoritative expression of ethically sound
practices. State bar associations began to adopt the ABA’s rules, with
some modifications (and, indeed, the ABA Canons had been based on

180. See ABEL, supra note 59, at 40-73 (discussing regulation as a way of controlling the
production of lawyers).
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See Susan D. Carle, Lawyers’ Duty to Do Justice: A New Look at the History of the
1908 Canons, 24 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 1 (1999) (examining the Canons’ drafting process).
184. See Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910-1920),
20 L. & HIST. REV. 97 (2002); JERALD AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA (1976).
185. See Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism: The Mechanics
of Self-Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral, and Practical Approach of the
Canons, 83 NORTH CAROLINA L. REV. 411, 430 (2005) (noting that the canons were

“explicitly horatory in nature”).
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earlier state rules). 186 These developments came through force of
persuasion; the ABA did not have (and still does not have) legal power
to force jurisdictions to adopt its rules. Thus, as Terence Halliday has
argued, the activities of the ABA, as well as state and local voluntary
bar associations, filled a void left by a lack of government regulatory
and enforcement capacity in earlier stages of state and nation
building. 187
By the mid-twentieth century, in most states, bar associations had
begun to serve as quasi-governmental bodies. 188 Volunteer committees
organized through state or local bar associations assumed responsibility
screening persons for admission into the bar, and also for
recommending discipline for ethics violations in the first instance (with
later court review). 189 Looking to the ABA’s model rules as a template,
state bar associations drafted their own legal ethics codes and then sent
them to state legislatures and/or courts with recommendations for
adoption as binding law applying to all licensed legal practitioners
within their jurisdictions. Halliday’s thesis is that voluntary bar
associations in this way contributed to state building by performing
functions the states could not afford to fund or staff. 190
The development of voluntary ethics codes, which government
entities only later adopted as law binding on lawyers practicing within
their jurisdictions, had auxiliary benefits as well. First, and most
importantly by analogy to the current Russian situation, the formation
of a private, elitist professional organization at the national level helped
protect the development of the legal profession in a manner that was
independent of government control. The United States legal profession,
like that in many Western democracies, has historically prided itself on
this independence. 191 To a large extent, the legal profession in the
United States continues to have considerable independence from the
186. See generally id. at 426-30 (explaining the reciprocal influence of state and national
legal ethics rules).
187. TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND
PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 377–79 (1987).
188. Barton, supra note 185, at 430-34 (tracing the way in which ethics rules gradually
become enforceable through the work of state and local bar associations).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 13–14.
191. See generally Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 BOSTONBOS. U.
L. REV. 1 (1988) (discussing in historical what lawyers in the U.S. have meant by professional
independence and how they have pursued this goal).
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state (though not so much from the business interests it typically
represents). It has developed and exercised considerable political
muscle that allows it to fight back, often but not always successfully,
against attempts to imposed unwanted “external” (or governmentimposed) regulation. 192
In the Russian context, formation of a voluntary association of
elite jurists could have similar benefits. A voluntary association of
lawyers wishing to signal their adherence to the highest ethical
standards could draft a voluntary code of ethics to which members
would agree to adhere. Because complying with this code would be
voluntary, such an approach could largely circumvent concerns about
undue state domination of the legal profession through government
regulation. In Russia, jurists and others have raised such concerns as
reasons to oppose the Ministerial Working Group’s proposals, as
already discussed, 193 but a voluntary code developed by jurists
themselves would not be subject to these critiques.
If elite jurists were to come together in an organization through
which they developed their own voluntary code of ethics, they could
signal the quality of their work and ethical standards to clients and
others. Through a process of deliberation, they could develop rules they
found feasible and appropriate to the context in which they work. They
could evaluate and then pick and choose from the many ethics codes
already existing for legal practitioners around the world, adopting and
adapting standards as best fitted to their circumstances and priorities. It
is likely that not all jurists would want to subscribe to such rules, but
this would serve the signaling function of distinguishing those holding
the highest ethics standards from others.
A voluntary bar association could also enforce ethics rules against
its members. Publishing complaints and resolutions of them in a public
database accessible on the Internet would allow prospective clients to
research the track record of jurists, thus providing some additional
measure of client protection and quality control. These methods of
encouraging high ethical standards might not be the end game for legal
192. An example of an unsuccessful but very hard-fought fight is enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, which was codified in scattered sections of
11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.the United States Code. It granted the Securities and Exchange
Commission the power to regulate the disclosure obligations of lawyers representing publicly
traded corporations in the United States. See Lawrence J. Fox, Dan’s World: A Free Enterprise
Dream; An Ethics Nightmare, 55 BUS. LAW. 1533 (2000) (excoriating Congress for violating
the professional independence and self-regulation of the U.S. legal profession).
193. See supra Part III.A.
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profession reform but could provide an interim step that would move
the reform project forward.
As another benefit, the coming together of elite jurists into a
national organization might create the basis for unified, politically
effective influence. Advokatura already have an organization that plays
this role; if jurists created their own organization, they too could
amplify their voice on matters involving protecting rule of law,
recognizing and guarding legal privilege and client confidentially, and
speaking out in support of other fundamental principles that
characterize independent and fair judicial systems and legal professions
in other parts of the world. Of course, in the Russian context
government entities are unlikely to grant civil society organizations the
same latitude and freedom from government interference that the ABA
enjoyed in its early, formative years. Admittedly, this is a crucial
difference. The political conditions for the development of a powerful,
unified legal profession with strong independence from the state do not
appear to exist in Russia today. Nevertheless, the example of the
Advokatura’s Federal Bar Chambers shows that lawyers’ associations
can have a strong voice in Russian policy. The longer, pre-Soviet
history of the Russian legal profession also reveals historical
antecedents that provide models for a strong, self-regulating, and
independent legal profession. Thus, regardless of what happens with
other reform initiatives, collective voluntary action by Russia’s elite
jurists could present a lever for successful legal profession and legal
system reform.
IV. CONCLUSION
At the date of writing, it is still too early to form a view on the fate
of the on-going Russian reform of its legal profession. It does seem
possible, however, to offer a few general remarks.
First, the Russian reform is an interesting example of the tension
between international “best standards” in profession regulation, and the
specific constraints that arise from discrete historical circumstances.
Russia now finds itself in the unusual position of having a large
majority of unregulated practitioners, which would seem to militate for
a speedy introduction of norms. Yet Russia has also been undergoing
an unprecedented transformation away from communism which has, at
least in theory, sought to place itself under democratic auspices (unlike
other transitional countries). Furthermore, when introduced by Russian
governments in the past, international models and “best standards” did
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not always contribute to healthy outcomes (for example, the
widespread privatizations of the nineties). And yet, in the area of the
drafting of normative legal acts such as the civil and commercial codes,
the result has been more positive. Should international standards for the
regulation of the legal profession be the inspiration? Or would the
specific Russian circumstances justify a more idiosyncratic approach?
The varying perspectives of our authors seem to be underpinned by
different intuitive answers to this question.
Second, the Russian reform raises the question of the place of the
legal profession in the wider development of the rule of law. The
absence of regulation of the legal profession coexists with a wider legal
system that suffers from a number of systemic weaknesses, connected
to the functioning of the state itself. In such situations, what is the
singular place or priority of professional regulation of the private
profession? Some of us consider that it is necessary to press forward
regardless of the wider systemic difficulties, while others question
whether the private profession is really the priority.
Third, the Russian situation raises the question of the tension
between government driven regulation of the profession and
contribution of the legal profession itself to this process. A large
segment of the Russian legal profession has developed free of state
intervention, and now represents an integral segment of the system.
This is a country where state intervention has not always historically
been known to promote the general interest: should the current situation
justify government regulation nevertheless, or is voluntary
participation of the profession all the more necessary in such
circumstances? Some of us draw on historical examples in the early
days of nation-building, in the United States, to show how voluntary
development of professional rules filled the void, in conjunction with
other non-state actors such as universities, while others consider that in
Russia, as in other civil law countries, state leadership is both beneficial
and an unavoidable necessity.
Many questions remain to be answered. At this point, however, it
seems possible for us to all agree that the current reform effort is being
conducted with commendable levels of consultation, and that there is
proper awareness of the complexity and diversity of interests at play.
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